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ABSTRACT 
 
DIVIDED AGENCIES: INTERNAL STRIFE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CASTRO 
 
 
by 
 
 
Stephanie Schmidt  
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018 
Under the supervision of Dr. Aims McGuinness 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis examines how the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. State Department 
differed in their approaches to dealing with the Castro regime from 1959 through the 
aftermath of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Using declassified documents from the CIA and 
State Department, I argue that the approaches of the CIA in dealing with the Castro 
regime were more aggressive than the approaches of the U.S. State Department. Many 
of the primary sources used in this work were accessed in the CIA electronic reading 
room and on the office of the historian website. The office of the historian is an official 
government office within the Bureau of Public Affairs responsible for publishing 
declassified historical documents related to U.S. foreign policy. The thesis contributes to 
the historiography of U.S.-Cuban relations by exposing tensions and rifts inside the U.S. 
government during a pivotal era in the history of both nations.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Cuba has long been a nation dominated by foreign powers. Spain and the United 
States have both exerted their influence over the island nation. Spain was first from 
early 1500s to 1898 and the United States became more involved in Cuba after the 
Cubans organized an independence movement against Spain. Over the course of the 
twentieth century the United States and Cuba had a dynamic relationship. This 
relationship was most tumultuous after Fidel Castro took power and the United States 
government agencies were divided on the issue of how to most effectively deal with the 
Castro Regime. In my thesis, I argue that the CIA had more aggressive foreign policy 
strategies for Cuba than did the State Department from 1959 through the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA had more of a hand in guiding policy. 
However, after the Bay of Pigs failure, much of that changed. The rise, of Fidel Castro 
was the spark that ignited the turbulent relationship between the United States and 
Cuba. His rise was rooted in a long Cuban struggle against imperialism.  
 When Christopher Columbus first encountered the island in 1492, he described 
it as the most beautiful land he had ever looked upon. As it turned out, Columbus was 
not alone in his admiration of the land we today call Cuba. For more than four centuries 
Spain guarded Cuba as one of its prized possessions due to all of its resources. The 
island’s Spanish rulers dubbed the island “the Pearl of the Antilles,” as it was the largest 
island in the Caribbean and centrally located, making it exceptionally valuable in the 
sphere of global trade.1  
                                                        
1 Peter Moruzzi, Havana Before Castro: When Cuba was a Tropical Playground. (Layton: Gibbs 
Smith, 2008),12-14.  
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Cubans, however, became increasingly dissatisfied with colonial rule and in the 
early 1880s began to speak about organizing an independence movement which would 
free them from Spanish colonial rule.2 However, not all Cubans wanted independence. 
There was a group of Creole elites called “the autonomists” who supported maintaining 
a colonial relationship with Spain because they feared decolonization would result in 
economic instability for Cuba.3 As the autonomists feared, the Cuban economy did 
indeed destabilize, but not due to decolonization. Instead, the economy was negatively 
affected by a drop in sugar production in Cuba during the Ten Years war from1868 to 
1878.4 The damaged economy was enough for some autonomists to accept the idea of 
fighting for independence.  
A Cuban journalist and poet named Jose Martí organized a sophisticated 
independence movement by mobilizing Cubans who were in favor of independence. His 
forces included Cubans living on the island along with members of the Cuban diaspora 
who fled Cuba and settled in American cities like New York and Tampa.  The 
independence war began in 1895 and raged on through 1897. Initially the insurrection 
was little more than a few isolated skirmishes, but it developed into a revolution which 
demanded Spain’s attention. Spain sent troops to put down the rebellion, but the Cuban 
independence movement persisted. After two years of fighting Spain granted Cuba 
limited autonomy on January 1, 1898. 5 
                                                        
2 Louis Pérez Jr., Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy, Athens:  University of 
Georgia Press, 2003, 80.  
3 Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 55.  
4 Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 57.  
5 Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 70-84.  
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Cuba was freer than it had ever historically been from imperialist and colonial 
interests. However, officials in the U.S. government capitalized on Cuba’s vulnerable 
position by staging the explosion of the USS Maine in Havana harbor. The destruction 
of the Maine was conveniently blamed on Spain, and thus was able to intervene in 
Spanish/Cuban relations and “free” Cuba entirely from colonial rule. The intervention in 
Spanish/Cuban relations at such a critical point in Cuba’s history enabled the United 
States to position itself as Cuba’s rescuer and thus make demands from their newly 
acquired ally. 
Once Cuba was mostly under U.S. control, they quickly drafted the Platt 
Amendment which ensured the United States permanent access to Cuba and the right 
to intervene in Cuba’s governmental affairs.  The nation went through a series of puppet 
governments controlled remotely from Washington, D.C. American businesses were 
established in Cuba and flourished throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 
Americans built homes in Cuba and the island became one of the top American tourist 
destinations. The relationship Cuba had with the United States caused the Cuban 
economy to boom due to new global trading opportunities, increased tourism, and 
industrial development. By the 1950s, however, there was substantial discontent in the 
country. The leaders were corrupt and led with their own best interests in mind, rather 
than the interests of the nation. The rich became richer, while most of the peasants 
were illiterate, unskilled workers with no access to health care.  
 A revolution was born from the discontent felt by many Cubans. A revolutionary 
force led by Fidel Castro developed in the early 1950s and erupted in an attack on July 
26, 1953. The Castro brothers and roughly 140 rebels attacked the Moncada barracks, 
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a federal Garrison in Santiago de Cuba, in an effort to spark a revolution. The 
revolutionary leaders identified the barracks as an ideal place to launch the revolution 
because the barracks had massive amounts of weapons. Therefore, if the attack were 
successful, the revolution would have acquired a multitude of firearms to add to their 
stock.6 
The revolutionaries, however, were unsuccessful. Some of the men were 
executed, but Fidel Castro was put on trial and given the opportunity to defend his 
actions. It was in these hearings that Fidel Castro delivered his most famous speech: 
History will Absolve Me. In the four-hour speech, Castro attempted to defend himself by 
justifying his revolutionary ideals and criticizing Fulgencio Batista, the dictator of Cuba in 
1953. Castro stated in his speech “we set out to fight for Cuba’s freedom and we are not 
ashamed for having done so.”7  Castro was found guilty of conspiring and staging an 
attack and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Of those fifteen years he served 
less than two as Batista released a slew of political prisoners as a result of international 
pressures asking him to do so. Therefore, Fidel Castro was free. Castro and his 
revolutionaries had indeed lost the battle at the Moncada barracks but would reemerge 
in 1959 to win the war.  
This work examines the roots of Cuba’s conflict with the United States starting 
with the first Cuba’s Revolution from Spain in 1898 and concluding with the close of the 
Cuban Missile crisis in 1962. However, in order to understand events in this era, it is 
                                                        
6 Jane Franklin and Noam Chomsky, Cuba and the U.S. Empire: A Chronological History, (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 2016), 15.  
 
7 Fidel Castro, “History Will Absolve Me,” Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La Habana,  
Cuba,1953, Castro Internet Archive, Accessed August 30, 2018. 
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vital to understand the earlier history of Cuba and its relationship to the United States. 
Castro may have never risen to power in the first place had it not been for the imperial 
relationship between the United States and Cuba. Thus, the first chapter opens with a 
discussion on how America became invested in Cuba and what the United States had 
to lose from a revolutionary movement like that of Fidel Castro’s. The first chapter lays 
the framework for many of the conflicts that came to a head in the early sixties, and still 
haunt the United States and Cuba today.  
The second chapter outlines the rise of a new regime in Cuba. What started out 
as a laughable rebellion in the Sierra Maestra mountains quickly gained traction and 
became a widely known and feared rebel group. Those rebels were led by Fidel Castro, 
his brother Raúl Castro, and his partner Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The regime made their 
way from the southeastern region of Cuba toward Havana. They successfully overthrew 
the Batista regime and declared victory on January 1, 1959. U.S. government officials 
were certainly threatened by Fidel Castro and his rebels, because the U.S. supported 
the Batista regime. It is an understatement to say that they were perturbed by the 
Cuban Revolution and its new leaders. 
The third chapter outlines the controversy in approaches on dealing with Castro, 
within different agencies in the United States. As officials in the United States 
government adjusted to the changing state of affairs in Cuba, some agencies developed 
negative views about the new revolutionary leader. This was largely due to the fact that 
Castro condemned imperialism and argued that Cuba could never be truly free if its 
government continued to be monitored, influenced and driven by the United States. The 
U.S. was however comforted by the fact that Castro preached democratic ideals and 
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valued the voting and elections process. For example, in January of 1959 Castro 
claimed that Cuba would have no more dictators and stated in a BBC interview, “I would 
think that in 18 months, about, we will have free elections.”8  
Castro also preached other ideals. He valued things like education and literacy, 
accessible health care, and national pride. One of the most notable aspects of Castro’s 
speeches was his ability to communicate his nationalist ideals without sounding like a 
crazed, power hungry hypnotist who forced his people to adopt his beliefs. His 
speeches were peaceful yet strong. In examining Castro’s speeches, it becomes 
evident how he was able to appeal to the masses. He identifies the people as the heart 
and soul of the revolution in an effort to encourage people to relate to the movement 
and develop a sense of ownership of the movement. As the people began to feel 
validated and feel like they were part of something bigger than themselves, the 
population quickly developed a heightened sense of nationalism. In his speeches, 
Castro demonstrated a dedication to his countrymen and demanded justice, freedom, 
and human rights for all Cubans, not only the members of the privileged class, which he 
argued was the case with Batista in office.  
His anti-imperialist rhetoric, however, quickly turned into actions that U.S. policy 
makers perceived as hostile toward American interests. Conflicts between the two 
nations developed early on. Castro instituted an agrarian reform in the summer of 1959, 
which was arguably the spark of the conflict between the United States and Cuba. He 
                                                        
8 Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro on his beard, Free Elections & Gambling, (1959, London: 
BBC News), YouTube, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDZ5GyVDqOc. 
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aimed to redistribute land that belonged to wealthy farmers and plantation owners, 
including Americans, to peasants who could work the land to provide for their families. 
While Castro believed the outcome of his policies would benefit his people and raise the 
standard of living for average Cubans, U.S. officials interpreted his new programs and 
legislation as acts of aggression toward U.S. businesses and the U.S. government. The 
Agrarian Reform went into effect on June 3, 1959. What followed was a battle of tug of 
war between the United States and Cuba.  First, U.S businessmen and policy makers 
protested Castro’s agrarian reform, then Castro reduced the amount of money Cuba 
paid to the American owned Cuban Electric Company. The decrease in revenue was 
answered with U.S. bombs being dropped over Cuban sugar mills in the country side. 
The bombings pushed Castro to expropriate 70,000 acres of property owned by U.S. 
companies. The United States government then embarked on a series of protests which 
only worsened the heated situation.9 
United States officials refused to allow Castro to make changes in Cuba if those 
changes came at the expense of American property. Therefore, as Castro embarked on 
more and more expropriation campaigns, U.S. officials and property owners became 
increasingly infuriated with him. When Castro entered into trade agreements with 
countries in the Eastern Hemisphere, such as the Soviet Union, United States officials 
were more threatened than ever.  
Even after Castro developed left-leaning policies and made economic 
agreements with the Soviet bloc, Castro still maintained that he was not a communist. 
By the time Castro did declare himself a communist and produce a socialist constitution 
                                                        
9 Franklin, Cuba and the U.S. Empire, 21-24. 
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for his nation on May 1, 1963, the U.S. government had already turned against him. 
U.S. officials perhaps believed that Castro’s actions spoke louder than his words. 
Several members and agencies of the U.S. government had long been concerned that 
Cuba would fall to communism. Therefore, it came as little surprise when it did.  
Chapter four and five of this thesis explores the relationship between Cuba and 
the United States under the Kennedy administration. The Kennedy administration took 
over the plans drafted during the Eisenhower administration. In both 1959 and 1960 
plans by U.S. government agencies were set in motion to combat what U.S. officials 
perceived to be direct aggression from Fidel Castro. The State Department and the CIA 
were the two main contributors of strategies on how to deal with the Cuban “problem” 
during the early years of the Castro regime. The two agencies competed with one 
another to craft the most cunning and effective plans for destabilizing Cuba; plans which 
Kennedy executed quickly after becoming president.  
This thesis argues that the CIA’s plans and strategies for dealing with the Castro 
regime were more aggressive than the plans devised by the State Department.  The 
CIA drafted plans for an invasion of Cuba even when some argued that Cuba posed 
little threat at all to the United States. Even after their first plan, “Operation Zapata” or 
the “Bay of Pigs” as it is commonly known, failed miserably, the CIA still did not alter 
their strategy. They instead designed another plan, “Operation Mongoose,” which 
consisted of propaganda initiatives, another land invasion and assassination plots 
against Fidel Castro.  
In contrast to the CIA, the State Department used different methods to deal with 
the Cuban situation. They argued for the use of economic warfare rather than military 
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warfare. They tried to destabilize Cuba by using more peaceful methods and strategies. 
The State Department was by no means friendly to Fidel Castro or members of his 
revolution, but they certainly opposed an attack on the nation. They focused their 
energies on propaganda, infiltration, and economic sabotage. The details of strategies 
proposed by the CIA and the State department are analyzed in Chapter 3, in a 
discussion of cutthroat economics versus military force.  
From the time Castro rose to power in 1959 through the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
1962 neither the CIA nor the State Department altered their strategies much. The 
passage of time and the worsening relationship between Washington and Havana did 
not seem to be catalysts for change. Once the CIA and the State Department developed 
their approaches, they maintained those approaches in most instances from the start of 
Castro’s revolution through the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 My research relies on documents from each agency to track the decisions made 
from the beginning of the Castro administration through the Cuban missile crisis. 
Records from the CIA include estimates, memorandums, weekly summary reports and 
other documents from CIA declassified files. The documents lend insight on vital pieces 
of information like how the CIA felt about Castro, the CIA’s evaluation of Cuba’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union, and outlook for future relations between the United 
States in Cuba. 
The State Department’s documents from this period indicate that the State 
Department took a different approach toward Castro between 1959 and 1962.  While 
the State Department documents illuminate intricate propaganda schemes and plans of 
economic sabotage, they also demonstrate the State Department's willingness to work 
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with Cuba. In certain instances, the State Department even listed expectations which 
Cuba needed to meet in order to continue to pursue a diplomatic relationship with 
Castro’s revolutionary regime. These documents indicate that the State Department 
attempted to influence the revolutionary government, and State Department officials 
seem to have had some hope for mending the damaged relationship.  I argue that such 
documents tell a story that is often missed in the historiography of U.S. Cuban relations: 
a story of attempts at compromise between two antagonistic nations.  
Though these two agencies operated within the same country, they had vastly 
different ideals and methods in regard to handling foreign relations. This thesis aims to 
examine the stance of the Central Intelligence agency and the position of the State 
Department in their dealings with Cuba from the start of the Castro administration 
through the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.    
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Historiography 
 
 
The historiography of U.S./Cuban relations is vast. Scholars have used many 
different approaches in their study of U.S. Cuban relations, but the relationship between 
the State Department and the CIA has been underexplored. This work aims to compare 
the differences between the CIA’s approach and the State Department’s approach to 
Cuban affairs between 1959 and the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961.  
A useful chronological guide for this research is Jane Franklin’s Cuba and the 
U.S. Empire. Franklin does not propose an argument in her work. The book offers a day 
by day chronology of Cuba’s important events from 1492 up to the twenty first century. 
Franklin’s work serves as a valuable reference guide for dates and events. She devotes 
substantial attention to the CIA and the State Department. Franklin also highlights key 
points of the attempted assassinations against Castro. In the text Franklin describes the 
uncertainty surrounding who ordered the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro, who 
was hired to carry them out, and who in the U.S. government knew about the orders.  
One of the leading scholars of Cuban history, Louis Pérez, Jr., has contributed a 
vast amount of literature to the historiography of U.S./Cuban relations. Two of his works 
are especially relevant when discussing imperialism and comparing motives and 
approaches of U.S. government agencies. In Cuba and the United States: Ties of 
Singular Intimacy, Pérez argues that the United States has never been supportive of 
Cuban independence importantly because of Cuba’s position in global trade routes. 
Thus, 
 the United States government never wanted Cuba to be a free nation with sole 
ownership of valuable coastal land. After the first Cuban Revolution of 1898, U.S. 
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officials did not want Cuba to be the sole owners of these resources because they 
wanted to be able to construct ports for trade. In this work, Pérez traces the history 
beginning with the first Cuban independence war with Spain and ending with the Cuban 
Revolution. In his comments on the Cuban Revolution and the U.S. reaction to it, Pérez 
explained that assassination plans for Castro and invasion plans for Cuba were both 
unsuccessful due to the fact that many government officials, the CIA especially, 
underestimated how much the Cuban people supported Castro.10 
In Cuba in the American Imagination, Pérez states that “all that is American 
Imperialism, has been practiced in Cuba.”11 Pérez’s argument in Cuba in the American 
Imagination thus contends that Cuba was a preliminary run for U.S. imperialism abroad. 
He argues that the United States’ actions in Cuba signaled to the world how U.S. 
officials wanted America to be defined and perceived. Furthermore, U.S. actions in 
Cuba exposed America’s purpose in the world. He further argues that power and 
morality are linked and that the United States government tried to convince its people 
that owning Cuba was a plausible goal.  
Like Pérez, Michael Neagle argues in America’s Forgotten Colony that by 
roughly 1915, most Americans firmly believed that the U.S. government would make 
short work of acquiring Cuba. He argues that this became especially true as more 
investors and land owners purchased property in Cuba. Americans expected that 
ownership of Cuba by the United States would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. American 
imperialism was alive and thriving in twentieth century Cuba. However, Neagle’s 
                                                        
10 Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 249.  
11 Pérez, Louis A. Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2008. 1.  
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narrative is different from other scholars because he argues that Cold War issues 
resulted from events in the twentieth century. He points to legislation such as the Platt 
Amendment and American businessmen endorsing casinos and other outlets for vice on 
the island to support his claim. However, he also argues that the relationship between 
the United States and Cuba from 1898-1953 was not as adversarial as their relationship 
during Castro’s rule. I challenge this assertion because I would argue the relationship 
was only less adversarial from 1898-1953 because the United States occupied Cuba for 
many of those years. Therefore, United States officials had less problems with the 
Cuban government during this period because they ran the Cuban government and 
were faced with less opposition.  
Jules Benjamin’s The United States and Cuba has a similar argument to that of 
Neagle in his discussion of the root cause of the United States’ adverse relationship 
with Cuba. He claims that modern conflicts between the two nations are rooted in the 
history of U.S. dominance over Cuba and Cuba’s resistance to that influence. Benjamin 
further examines the difficulties Cuba faced as a result of its relationship to the U.S. and 
effects of U.S. imperialism on the island. He also discusses the role of economics in 
regard to U.S. /Cuban relations and policymaking.12    
Stephen Cimbala approaches the topic of relations between the United States 
and Cuba through a military lens in Military Persuasion. His main argument in the piece 
is the military success during the Cold War, in Cuba, was determined mostly by how 
effective the United States, the “deliverers of a threat”, were in convincing Cuba, “the 
                                                        
12 Jules Benjamin, The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1977, xi.  
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receivers of the threat,” that if certain demands or objectives were met, there would be 
no military escalation.13 He comments specifically on how the CIA was ineffective at 
delivering threats because their plans were insufficient when it came to Cuba and they 
seriously underestimated Fidel Castro. Cimbala’s narrative is interesting because his 
topic is focused on military tactics but his arguments center around diplomacy.  
Lars Schoultz has a stance on the issue of foreign relations with Cuba that is 
similar to that of Cimbala. Schoultz’s argument in That Infernal Little Cuban Republic 
aligns with Cimbala in that it references the effort that the United States needed to 
establish a policy of “nut-pinching,” as Sen. J. William Fulbright called it.14 Schoultz’s 
central argument is that American ideology is deeply rooted in sixteenth-century 
realism, emphasizing that the “strong do what they want, and the weak accept what 
they must.” He claims that because the Bay of Pigs invasion was a failure, the United 
States had to weigh its opportunity costs for an additional invasion, and the U.S. 
government ultimately decided that it would be less costly to establish an embargo 
against Cuba than it would be to plan and execute another invasion.15  
In the year before the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Eisenhower chose to 
establish the 1960 embargo. However, though there would be no subsequent invasion, 
the conversation on assassinating Fidel Castro was not entirely off the table. Schoultz 
points out that the United States government, and the CIA in particular, did not halt 
                                                        
13  Stephen Cimbala, Military Persuasion; Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War, 
(University Park: Penn State Press), 1994, 21.  
14 Lars Schoultz, Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the 
Cuban Revolution. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 5.  
15 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 555.  
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assassination attempts on Fidel Castro until the late 1970s.16 Schoultz titled one of his 
chapters “He’s Going to be There until He Dies,” a line most famously spoken by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966. As it turns out, Johnson was correct in his 
assumption that Castro would “be there until he died,” because Castro passed his 
power on to his brother Raúl Castro in 2008 and succumbed to a death by natural 
causes in November of 2016.  A statement like “He’s going to be there until he dies” 
would be a rather obvious statement if it had been made about a national leader that 
U.S. officials liked and respected. However, this statement, when made about Castro, 
was meant negatively. U.S. government officials tried multiple times to assassinate 
Castro and were disappointed with their failure to succeed in their mission. Later 
presidents also eagerly awaited Castro’s death. In 1990 Bill Clinton stated that Castro 
“can’t last forever. No one lives forever. . . One day the good Lord will take Fidel Castro 
away.”17   
While the CIA prepared for the initial attacks against Castro’s life, President 
Kennedy approved the 1960 embargo in hopes that it would cause Castro’s regime to 
collapse and make way for Kennedy to bring about the demise of the Castro regime. 
While the embargo certainly did damage to Cuba, the U.S. never attained its goal to 
overthrow the Cuban government while Fidel was still alive. The central question of 
Schoultz’s work becomes: How did Cuba prevail, despite their refusal to “accept what 
they must.” 
                                                        
16 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 200.  
17 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 561. 
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William Leogrande and Peter Kornbluh’s Back Channel to Cuba provides the 
reader with an account of the factors which stalled and accelerated U.S. relations with 
Cuba in the 20th Century. The authors focus on unconventional ways in which 
information circulated between the two countries. The main argument is that state 
secrets and sensitive information were oftentimes transferred through the hands of 
unlikely sources including ABC journalists and Pope Francis. Leogrande and Kornbluh 
dedicate much time to the discussion of the CIA and their relationship with Cuba. They 
further commented on how the assassination attempts of Fidel Castro may have been 
too elaborate and that this complexity may have contributed to their failure. They 
discussed the strategies for assassinations such as poisoned scuba equipment, 
poisoned cigars, and contaminated pills. Lastly, they argued that the “perpetual 
antagonism” between the United States and Cuba was of the “most entrenched and 
enduring conflicts in the history of U.S. foreign policy.”18  
 I aim to explore this conflict differently than many historians and scholars have 
thus far. Much scholarship has been published on the differing ideals stemming from 
Washington and Havana. However, there are fewer works of scholarship that focus on 
the internal tensions in the United States approach toward Cuba.  
My thesis contributes to the scholarship on the history of U.S./Cuban relations 
and has a specific niche because the narrative will be situated within the context of 
documents produced by the CIA and the U.S. State Department. My work will be 
                                                        
18 Leogrande William M, and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of 
Negotiations between Washington and Havana, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 
2014, 2.  
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organized in a similar fashion to that of Michael Neagle’s, as I aim to date my research 
back to the late nineteenth century. 
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Chapter 1 
From Colony to Puppet Government 
 
The relevant history of the relationship between Cuba and the United States 
began around the turn of the nineteenth century, during Cuba’s independence 
movement from Spain. Spain colonized Cuba in the early 1500s and maintained control 
of the island until 1898. Spain developed an unprecedented sugar industry in Cuba and 
by the mid-1800s it became the world’s number one producer of sugar. Cuba exported 
other goods like coffee and tobacco, but sugar comprised 83 percent of Cuban 
exports.19 
U.S. government officials, businessmen, and investors were not oblivious to the 
enormous profit turned by the sugar industry in Cuba, as the United States was the 
recipient of 40 percent of all exported Cuban sugar. By the late 1880s the U.S. imported 
more Cuban goods than Spain. The sugar industry, coupled with Cuba’s prime location 
for trade, and potential for naval bases, made Cuba an ideal subject for purchase by the 
United States.  
The United States government did in fact attempt to buy Cuba from the Spain 
government. In fact, in 1854 under the leadership of President Franklin Pierce, the U.S. 
government drafted an official document called the Ostend Manifesto which 
recommended that Cuba be sold to the U.S. by Spain for the price of 130 million dollars, 
the equivalent of roughly 3.5 billion dollars today. The authors of the document 
suggested that if Spain refused to sell Cuba, “we shall be justified in wrestling it from 
                                                        
19 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the U.S. Empire, 4.  
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Spain… upon the very same principle that would justify an individual tearing down the 
burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames 
from destroying his home.” 20 The Ostend Manifesto was rejected by Congress and U.S. 
officials put to rest the idea of purchasing Cuba from Spain. However, the issue 
resurfaced in 1897 under the William McKinley administration and the United States 
treasury offered Spain 300 million dollars, the equivalent to roughly 8.3 billion dollars 
today, and Spain rejected the offer.21  
In the years that U.S. government officials worked on persuading Spain to sell 
Cuba, many Cubans mobilized and established an independence movement to free 
themselves from Spanish rule.  This independence movement was an extension of the 
two previous wars fought between Cuban revolutionaries and Spanish soldiers. The two 
wars were the Ten Years’ War from 1868-1878 and the Guerra Chiqita from 1879 to 
1880.  
The desire for independence in Cuba was not universal. There were 
autonomists, also known as loyalists, who preferred to remain a colony of Spain 
because they feared economic collapse would be inevitable if Spain were pushed out. 
There were also separatists who sought freedom from Spain and believed in “Cuba 
Libre” or “Free Cuba.” Jose Martí, the most prominent leader of the Independence 
movement,’ described “Cuba Libre” as more than just freedom from Spain, but rather, 
freedom from all imperialist influence.22 He founded the official Cuban Revolutionary 
Party in 1892, and battle broke out between Spain, some Cuban loyalists, and the 
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Cuban Revolutionary Party in 1895.23  After much fighting, leaders of the revolution like 
José Martí and Antonio Maceo were killed and finally in 1897 the Spanish queen offered 
limited autonomy to Cuba. However, neither the loyalists nor the rebels accepted the 
offer.24 With the fighting raging in Cuba, President McKinley of the United States looked 
upon the Cuban situation with acquisitive eyes 
The opinions of Cubans on U.S. intervention were largely mixed.  Many of the 
Spanish born inhabitants of Cuba, called peninsulares, favored U.S. intervention 
because they preferred a government run by the United States than a government run 
by Cubans. Cuban businessmen and property holders favored U.S. intervention 
because they presumed their economy would improve if the U.S. took over. Those who 
opposed U.S. intervention were mostly the poor farmers and impoverished rural 
populations who thought their situation might worsen with a U.S. takeover.25 The United 
States intervened in 1898 in spite of opposition from groups of Cuban rebels. U.S. 
officials assumed that if the Cubans were successful in ousting Spain with American 
help, that the Cubans would feel indebted to the United States.  
In February of 1898 the USS Maine blew up in Havana harbor. The blast killed 
260 crew members. Officials in the U.S. government accused Spain of bombing the 
ship, which provided justification for militarily intervening in Cuba. Two months after the 
sinking of the USS Maine, congress approved a proposal to militarily invade Cuba with 
the intention of relinquishing Spanish rule in Cuba.  
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The United States wasted no time and within 10 days of congressional approval 
for Cuban intervention, the Teller Amendment was drafted. 26 The Teller Amendment 
stated that the United States would not colonize Cuba but instead would temporarily 
occupy the island until the Cubans were deemed able to self-govern.27 President 
McKinley then declared a blockade in Cuba to prevent Spain from reaching the Island. 
The Spanish declared war and U.S. congress answered back with their own declaration 
of war on April 25, 1898. The physical war lasted through the summer of 1898 with 
Spain and the United States drawing an armistice in August of 1898, followed by the 
Treaty of Paris, which officially ended the Spanish-Cuban-American War. In all, the 
United States acquired the territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines and 
temporary control over the island of Cuba. 28 As Lipman writes, “Spain handed its 
colony over to the United States rather than grant Cuba independence. In this manner, 
The United States erased more than thirty years of Cuban struggle and disingenuously 
positioned itself as Cuba’s liberator.”29  
Due to Cuba’s proximity to the United States and its apparent vulnerability, the 
United States developed a sense of presumed ownership of the island. John Quincy 
Adams once referred to Cuba as a “natural appendage to North America.” He furthered 
that statement by arguing that once Cuba broke away from Spain, that it would naturally 
gravitate toward the U.S.30 On top of the United States’ presumed ownership of Cuba, 
Lars Schoultz points out that the U.S. imperialists considered the United States a 
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paternal figure to Cuba; a teacher of sorts.31 Similarly, Michael Neagle notes how U.S. 
journalists and artists often portrayed Cuba as a threatened female or damsel in 
distress, with the United States coming swiftly to its rescue in times of need.32  
The Platt Amendment of 1901 was a document that reinforced the Teller 
Amendment and provided new stipulations regarding U.S.-Cuban relations. The 
document was drafted by Elihu Root of the United States and was presented to Cuba. 
The first stipulation was the Cuba would be under occupation of the U.S. until it was 
determined by the U.S. that Cuba was capable of self-governing. The Platt Amendment 
further stated that Cuba would allow the United States to intervene in governmental 
affairs at any time after the occupation, to protect the interests of independent Cuba. In 
addition, the document stipulated that Cuba was required to sell or lease segments of 
coastal land to the United States for use by the U.S. Navy. Lastly, the document 
prohibited Cuba from entering into any treaties with other foreign  
countries and also prohibited Cuba from allowing foreign nation besides the U.S., 
occupy any part of the island.  Though the Platt Amendment was unpopular with most 
Cubans, the U.S. officials insisted that the United States would not withdraw until Cuba 
incorporated the Platt Amendment into its new constitution. With the declaration of 
Tomás Estrada Palma as president, Cuba incorporated the Platt Amendment and 
withdrew their troops.33 
After American soldiers no longer occupied the island, the United States 
government managed to keep its grasp on Cuba via a legal lease of forty-five square 
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miles of land encompassing Guantánamo Bay, which was imposed in 1903. 
Guantánamo was not the U.S. government’s first choice for the placement of a navy 
base. They desperately wanted a base in Havana. But Cuban leaders fiercely resisted 
ceding land in Havana, offering Guantánamo to pacify the United States. 34  
U.S imperialists’ deep desire for Havana was partly due to their perception that 
more people in Havana were of European descent and had fairer skin than people in 
other regions of the island. Cubans in eastern provinces, including Guantánamo were 
populated mostly by people of color. In the eyes of U.S. officials, this made 
Guantánamo seem backward and wild in comparison to the more civilized Havana. 
Some officers were consumed by the racial issue and “imagined the possibility of 
possessing Guantánamo, without possessing the Guantanameros.”35 Despite their 
desire for Havana, the U.S. settled for Guantánamo because its location within the 
Caribbean was attractive even though they did not perceive the people as such.  
The United States seized for itself a one-sided deal on the land surrounding 
Guantánamo. It was leased to the United States by Cuba for a fee of two thousand 
dollars, in gold coin, per year, roughly $52,000 today. The U.S. essentially grabbed 
complete authority, jurisdiction, and control of the territory.  Additionally, there was no 
end date on the lease contract for the property. Thus, the eternal control extended by 
the lease of Guantánamo amplified the United States’ presumed sense of ownership of 
the island as a whole.  
After Guantánamo was secured for the United States, American businesses 
began to flourish in Cuba. Businessmen argued that since the U.S. continental frontier 
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was closed, those looking for farming opportunities would find the most luck in Cuba.36 
To American business owners Cuba was the new land of opportunity. 37 One of the 
main concerns for Americans looking to start businesses in Cuba was personal safety 
and security of their investments.  
 Large land-owning companies like the Isle of Pines Company put those fears to 
rest by reporting that “the United States government has absolutely pledged itself to see 
that an orderly government is maintained and there is today in the Isle of Pines as 
perfect security of life and property as in any part of the United States.” 38 These 
landholding companies also lobbied for the annexation of Cuba because Cuba 
becoming a legal territory of the United States would secure all investments. The best 
way to try and assure that annexation would take place was to encourage more 
Americans to invest and settle in Cuba.39 
 Landholding companies also made it their mission to ensure investors that they 
would not be poorly received by the Cuban people. They pledged that the island natives 
were quite welcoming to the incoming Americans. The natives were also reported as 
being non-hostile, intelligent, even gentlemanly—as opposed to the heathens and 
savages depicted in the media.40 Their efforts were not in vain because American 
interest certainly did take off. By 1910 roughly 10,000 Americans owned property in 
Cuba.41 
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There was an increase in the number of sugar plantations following the influx of 
American business to the island. Most of the large companies such as the Cuban-
American Sugar Company, United Fruit Company and Guantanamo Sugar Company 
were based in eastern Cuba.42 There were a few factors to explain this occurrence. 
First, the east was heavily populated by impoverished people of color, who represented 
a potential workforce. Additionally, there were migrant workers from Barbados, Jamaica, 
and Haiti who settled in eastern Cuba which added to the workforce. 43 Thirdly, the 
United States government maintained control of the port at Guantánamo. This made 
eastern Cuba an ideal location for growing sugar because it would not have to be 
transported a far distance before it could be exported.  
Sugar, however, was not the only valuable export. The rum and cigar industry 
also piqued the interest of American investors. Cuba’s soil and climate were ideal for 
the growing of tobacco. Thus, the cigar industry in Cuba was booming until the 1930’s 
when cigarettes surpassed cigars on the popularity scale. 44 Other business tycoons 
sought to make profits in Cuba as well. Businesses like the United Fruit Company, 
Goodyear Tires and Westinghouse all capitalized on opportunities to be had in Cuba. 
Much of the economic boom in Cuba however was centralized in Havana, leaving the 
rural populations still living in poverty. 45 
There was great variation among the landowning Americans in Cuba. 
Socioeconomic status dictated their Cuban experience. Typically, farmers and members 
of the middle class made Cuba their permanent home, as they could not afford to 
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migrate between Cuba and the United States for leisure or more desirable weather. 
Those of higher socioeconomic status, typically employed workers to operate their 
farms and businesses and enjoyed the luxury of returning to the United States 
whenever they desired.46 
Following the onset of Prohibition in the United States and the dawn of the 
roaring twenties, “Cuba became the playground of the Caribbean.” 47 Cuba quickly 
became America’s number one tourist destination. American investors began 
purchasing land to construct hotels and casinos. One of the most notable sales of 
Cuban land was to John McEntree Bowman. Bowman was the owner of the luxurious 
Biltmore hotel chain in America. He was eager to build what became known as the 
Sevilla-Biltmore, the most glamorous hotel in Cuba before the Hotel Nacional’s 
construction in 1930.  Bowman then went on to purchase other properties in Cuba such 
as the Havana Jockey Club, the Gran Casino Nacional and racetracks. 48  
 American tourism in Cuba boomed throughout the 1920s. Americans arrived by 
ship and by plane and made regular stops at taverns, casinos, and cabarets. Cuba was 
described on a vacation promotional booklet published by the Winter in Cuba 
Committee as a place where “Beauty reigns, relaxation prevails, and by courtesy of 
license your personal liberty is unrestricted. Havana is one of the best-ordered capitals 
in the world and is surely the liveliest.” 49 Cuba saw great economic gains in the 
twenties. However, much of that changed after the crash of the American stock market 
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in 1929, the onset of the great depression, and the end of Prohibition.50 In an attempt to 
combat the receding numbers of tourists, the renowned American architectural 
company McKim, Mead and White constructed the Hotel Nacional in 1930. It was 
finished with a blend of art deco, Moorish, and classical features. It quickly became the 
country’s leading hotel. After it opened it was reserved exclusively for tourists. No 
Cuban citizens other than government officials holding high office were permitted to stay 
at the Hotel Nacional de Cuba.51 
Politics in the 1920s were not as laid back as the social climate. In 1925 general 
Gerardo Machado became president of Cuba. He was a nationalist and a supporter of 
Cuban nationalist groups. The United States did not intervene in his regime because he 
was a known friend to U.S. business. After three years in office, Machado essentially 
reelected himself as president and assigned himself a six-year term, rather than a four-
year presidential term. His totalitarian governmental style, coupled with his reputation 
for ruthlessness and cruelty, earned him the title of dictator.52  
Cuban society and public opinion surrounding Machado was fragmented at first 
but quickly took a downward turn. Both Machado and his law enforcement became 
known for their brutal treatment of the Cuban people. Students and nationalists were 
rallying.  The business owners, many of which were American, demanded U.S. 
intervention because they were facing government oppression from above and 
nationalist resistance from below. Before the United States had the opportunity to 
intervene, Machado resigned the presidency and fled the country to avoid total 
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insurrection and probable death.53 One account of Machado’s escape describes how 
the dictator’s plane was chased by gunman in cars. The attackers were unable to stop 
the plane and Machado then resided in the United States for the remainder of his life. 54 
In lieu of Machado’s absence, Cuba named Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as an interim 
president, until elections could be held. Cespedes was a strategic choice for a leader, 
because he was a former ambassador to Washington. However, the American-born 
Cespedes did not last long in office. The Roosevelt administration partnered with 
Cuba’s Army Chief of Staff, Fulgencio Batista, and quickly overthrew the Cespedes 
regime. 55 Batista served as a leader of the country from 1933 to 1940 when he was 
officially elected president. He served as official president from 1940 to 1944.  
The Good Neighbor Policy was a new foreign relations policy aimed at trying to 
smooth the waters between the U.S and Latin America. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
was responsible for the execution of this new policy. His goal was to avoid armed 
intervention of any kind in Latin America and Cuba especially. The Good Neighbor 
Policy was in direct odds with the newly rescinded Platt Amendment. President 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy was non-intrusive and promoted more self-determination for 
Cuba than most other American policies had in the past. However, such a hands-off 
relationship was easy to maintain, with President Batista in office in Cuba, as he was 
effectively attached to Washington via puppet strings.  
Batista served his elected presidency from 1940-1944. After the end of his term, 
he held a powerful position in government as a provincial senator before running again 
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for president in 1952. His chances of winning the election were slim and instead of 
letting democracy run its course, he staged a governmental coup, nullified the 
constitution and declared himself the new dictator of Cuba. Harry Truman and his 
governmental officials moved quickly to recognize the new regime and supported 
Batista’s efforts.56  The support of the Truman administration was linked to the fact that 
Batista was a friend of American business. It was even rumored that the dictator was 
installed with the help of Wall Street sugar investors. 57 As the Batista dictatorship 
gained traction, oppositional forces began assembling. Peter Moruzzi sums up the state 
of Cuba at the dawn of the 1950s as follows:  
Cuba’s Achilles’ heel was an economy dominated by American Companies, and 
a relatively small Cuban elite. This was particularly evident in the contrast 
between prosperous Havana and the country’s desperately poor rural areas, 
where the growing seeds of discontent would be harvested by Castro and his 
revolution.58 
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Chapter 2 
 The Rise of a New Regime  
 
Fidel Castro graduated from law school in 1950 and began his crusade against 
Batista just two years later. His revolution was both political and social. He mobilized 
members of the rural and peasant classes and trained them in guerilla warfare tactics. 
He preached and promoted self-determination, anti-imperialism, and nationalist 
ideology. Castro’s goal to overthrow the Batista regime was clear, but the CIA was 
uncertain of what would follow Batista’s overthrow.59 The CIA held that Castro’s main 
objectives were to consolidate power and place the nation in his hands alone, distance 
Cuba from U.S. influence, and equalize wealth and privilege of all Cubans. 60  
Castro firmly believed in fighting to right the wrongs he felt Batista and the United 
States had committed against the nation of Cuba. Therefore, on July 26, 1953 Fidel 
Castro, and brother Raúl Castro led roughly 140 revolutionaries in an attack on the 
Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. The Moncada Barracks, one of the largest 
military garrisons in Cuba was an ideal location to wage an attack because it housed 
many weapons which, Castro and his revolutionaries would gain for use in their 
revolution, if the attack on the Moncada Barracks were successful.61 
 However, their attack failed and some of the revolutionaries were executed. Raúl 
Castro was spared his life but was arrested. Fidel Castro managed to escape and took 
refuge for several days in the Sierra Maestra mountains. After he was sure he would not 
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be tortured by the Batista Police and was promised a fair trial, he surrendered and was 
taken in to custody. In Fidel Castro’s defense hearing, he delivered a speech which 
became the most famous speech of his life, a speech titled “History Will Absolve Me.” In 
his trial on October 16, 1953 he proclaimed: 
I warn you, I am just beginning! If there is in your hearts a vestige of love for your 
country, love for humanity, love for justice, listen carefully. I know that I will be 
silenced for many years; I know that the regime will try to suppress the truth by 
all possible means; I know that there will be a conspiracy to bury me in oblivion. 
But my voice will not be stifled – it will rise from my breast even when I feel most 
alone, and my heart will give it all the fire that callous cowards deny it. 
 
Castro was ruled guilty for conspiring against the Batista regime and was sentenced to 
15 years in prison. However, in 1955 he and other political prisoners were granted 
amnesty by President Fulgencio Batista and fled to Mexico. In Mexico Castro met 
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, an Argentine revolutionary and together, Fidel Castro, Raúl 
Castro, and Che Guevara mad plans for a revolution. In Guevara’s journal he wrote: 
  I talked all night with Fidel. And in the morning, I had become the doctor of his 
new expedition. To tell the truth, after my experiences across Latin America I didn’t 
need much more to enlist for a revolution against a tyrant. But I was particularly 
impressed with Fidel. I shared his optimism. We needed to act, to struggle, to 
materialise our beliefs. Stop whining and fight.62 
 
   Over the course of 1955, Castro and Guevara garnered the support of roughly 
80 men to sail to Cuba with them the following year and begin the revolution. The group 
of revolutionaries sailed from Mexico to eastern Cuba on an old leisure yacht named the 
Granma. In early December of 1956 the Granma reached Cuba. Shortly after landing, 
the revolutionaries were ambushed by Batista’s men. Over half of the revolutionaries 
were killed in battle. The surviving members of the group took refuge in the Sierra 
                                                        
62 Anwar A. Kahn, My Friend Che Guevara, Sri Lanka Guardian, October 2, 2018, accessed on 
November 24, 2018, https://www.slguardian.org/my-friend-che-guevara/.  
32 
 
Maestra mountain range where they regained their footings to stage the revolution. 63 
 As Castro and his revolutionary force in the Sierra Maestra mountains planned 
their revolution, their ideals spread throughout the island. The ideals manifested into an 
attack on the Presidential Palace on March 13, 1957 by a group of students aiming to 
assassinate Fulgencio Batista. Batista however, managed to escape the assault 
unscathed but there was much bloodshed on both the side of the Cuban army and that 
of the rebels. The attack was unsuccessful, and Batista remained in power.64   
After the assault of the Presidential Palace, Batista and his police became 
seemingly paranoid about revolutionary attacks and became more aggressive and 
brutal toward discovered conspirators.65 Revolutionary activity also became more 
discreet. Castro and the revolutionaries moved carefully for several months. Some 
Cubans even believed Castro had given up the fight all together.66 Skirmishes began to 
once again break out in early 1958 and Batista had begun using U.S. trained and 
military personnel, and U.S. weaponry, supplied by the CIA, to combat the 
revolutionaries.67  Furthermore the U.S. Consul in Santiago de Cuba reported that 
Batista’s police applied their “own system of justice which is swift, effective and without 
appeal. As a daily occurrence bodies of young men are found hanged or lying along the 
roadside with as many as 40 bullet holes.”68 The brutality of the Cuban government was 
actually working against Batista because more Cuban people began to support the 
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revolution as they witnessed how cruel the Batista regime appeared.69  
Fidel Castro fulfilled his promise, that his voice would not be stifled, and by 
November of 1958, the revolutionaries had gained traction. On January 1, 1959 
President Batista fled Cuba after his six-year battle against the revolutionaries. The 
revolutionary forces took control of the capital city of Havana that very same day.70 
It was reported by American Embassy staff in Havana, that the overthrow of the 
Batista regime ignited a serious of chaotic riots and lootings across the capital city of 
Havana.71 The revolutionaries broadcasted on the national radio station condemning 
such behavior, but the destruction continued. People forced their way into prisons and 
freed all prisoners.  After the revolutionaries were able to force the Cuban army to 
surrender to their will, they were able to use that military force to suppress the violence 
in Havana.72  
The United States kept a close eye on Cuban affairs in the days following 
Batista’s overthrow. The American embassy called a meeting to discuss the recent 
events. All the men present at the meeting argued that it would be in the best interest of 
United States Businesses in Cuba, for the U.S. government to recognize the new 
Cuban regime. On January 6, 1959 the American embassy advised President 
Eisenhower and congress to recognize the new regime before Castro arrived in Havana 
because though he was not instated as the official President of Cuba, he was 
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“unquestionably the boss.”73  On January 7, 1959 John Foster Dulles, the U.S. 
Secretary of State wrote to president Eisenhower and reported that the nation of Cuba 
had returned to a peaceful state and there appeared to be no communist underpinnings 
in the new provincial government. Dulles ended his memorandum by requesting that 
President Eisenhower recognize the new regime. 74 
On January 9, 1959 Fidel Castro arrived in Havana and delivered a powerful 
speech, debriefing the revolution’s success. Castro identified the four main desires of 
the Cuban people as human rights, peace, liberty, and honest government. He 
promised that the new provincial government were actively making efforts to implement 
changes that would satisfy these desires. He further announced that he would not 
accept any kind of chief or ministerial position. Instead, he argued that he was more 
passionate about overseeing and reorganizing the Cuban military.75 In his speech he 
stated: 
I was asked what troops I would prefer to command, and I answered I would 
prefer to command the people.  Because the people are unconquerable and it 
was the people who won this war, because we had no army, we had no fleet, we 
had no tanks, we had no planes, we had no heavy guns, we had no military 
academies or recruiting and training teams.  We had neither divisions nor 
regiments nor companies nor platoons, but we have the confidence of the 
people, and with this alone we were able to win the battle for liberty. The people 
have won this war. 76 
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Castro was passionate about the will and vigor of the people and was proud of his 
nation. Still, the New York times reported on January 4, 1959 that Castro had no desire 
to run the country himself, and that his only aim was to “bring democracy to Cuba.”77  
Though neither of these statements by Castro stood the test of time, they temporarily 
pacified U.S. foreign policy leaders’ fears of communism spreading throughout the 
western hemisphere, and a new radical revolutionary regime. However, the relatively 
tranquil relationship between Castro and the United States government would be short 
lived. Ten days later Castro publicly condemned U.S. involvement of any kind in Cuban 
affairs, and by February 13, 1959 Fidel Castro was the new Prime Minister of Cuba.78   
 American Embassy staff first hinted at the threat of communism in Cuba in April 
of 1959. The dispatch began with a summary based on embassy staff observances. It 
stated: 
Under the benevolent tolerance of Fidel Castro and sheltered by his unfriendly 
attitude toward the United States and his drastic program of social and economic 
reform, Communism is growing in Cuba and successfully infiltrating various 
sectors of public life. The Communist Party (PSP) is functioning openly, and a 
number of publications and radio-TV programs are carrying its message. Main 
centers of Communist strength are in the Revolutionary Army and the labor 
unions.79 
 
 The report continued by stating that though Castro himself had not identified as a 
communist, he was still no friend to the United States. The report summary mentioned 
that communists had infiltrated various sectors of Cuban life and was allegedly 
spreading.  However, the report also noted there some groups within Cuba like the 
Catholic Church who opposed it and encouraged resistance to it. University statistics as 
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of April 14, 1959 remained unclear. It was documented that students had given left 
leaning speeches, but the popularity of the speeches remained ambiguous. The 
embassy argued that communist ideology was gaining momentum in Cuba for a few 
reasons. The first of which was that the communists cooperated with the revolutionary 
movement, thus winning their right to exist as a political group in Castro’s new honest 
government. The second factor in communist success was that though Castro had not 
openly declared himself a communist, many communist ideals and strategies paralleled 
those of Castro. Lastly, the communists were ready to fill the labor voids created by the 
overthrow of the Batista regime and the political exiles.80  
U.S. officials wanted to keep the communism contained and hinder the growth of 
the movement. The embassy drafted an action plan to combat the communist threat. 
They had a sixteen-step plan, with various tactics such as be friendly with the Cuban 
government, but be firm about negative feelings toward communism, try to keep Castro 
isolated from the communists, publish and shame discovered communists in the local 
Cuban media, and assist anti-communist Cubans in applying for U.S. visas. 81 However, 
analysists for the State Department argued that the surest way to stop Cuba from 
turning into a communist regime, was to ensure that the relationship between the United 
States and Fidel Castro was strong and positive. This is a key difference between the 
State Department’s approach to dealing with Castro and the CIA’s approach. The State 
Department aimed to keep a good relationship with Cuba, whereas the CIA’s mistrust of 
Castro may have clouded their ability to focus on a positive relationship with the nation 
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as a whole. The State Department quickly began planning a trip for Fidel Castro to visit 
the United States.  
For Washington, Castro’s visit was an opportunity for the United States to 
develop a positive relationship with Castro that could potentially foster grand economic 
opportunities for the United States and spare them future conflict. For Castro, the visit 
offered him a chance to discuss with the United States government how he wanted 
Cuba to be situated in U.S. foreign policy. Castro could articulate to U.S. officials that he 
had no interest in the United States exerting any kind of influence over the island of 
Cuba. However, Washington was prepared with scripted lines to pitch to Castro during 
the meeting, to try and persuade him to work with the United States in order to further 
U.S. interests.  
There were three approaches that the State Department proposed as acceptable 
suggestions on how to treat Castro during his visit to Washington. The first approach 
was to explain to Castro that the United States has always supported the development 
of democracy in Cuba, and to remind Castro that this was the goal when the United 
States aided the Cubans in their first revolution against Spain. Furthermore, they 
wanted to convince Castro that the only reason his revolutionaries supported his 
overthrow of Batista was because they hoped that the new regime would be a 
representative democracy.82  The writers of the memorandum intended that their 
suggestions to Castro would accomplish two goals. First, identifying that the United 
States was a friend to Cuba and wanted to see a democracy flourish there, would 
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position the United States in a positive light historically as Cuba’s rescuers and 
confidante. Second, they hoped it would force Castro to question the motives of his 
fellow revolutionaries. Did they overthrow Batista because they were opposed to corrupt 
government as Castro argued, or did they participate because they themselves desired 
democratic representation in their nation? 
In the second approach on dealing with Castro, the State Department framed 
their narrative to argue that the Cuban revolution was neither motivated by anti-
American ideology, nor by communist theory. Rather, it was supported by Cuban people 
who had been traditionally friendly toward the United States and thus, would never 
support a movement had it been laced with communist or anti-American sentiments.83 
This approach benefits the United States because it uses the people as a medium 
through which to control Castro. If Castro had the benefit of the people and their 
interests in mind, as he claimed, then he would be more receptive to the desires of 
those people—even if said desires were the manifestations of the U.S. government. 
  The third approach drafted by the State Department was to try to partner with 
Castro so that the United States could pursue interests that were best for both nations 
and respect each other’s devotion to freedom.84 This approach was ideal for the State 
Department because it would allow for access to Cuban resources by American 
businesses. The State Department would quite easily be able to use the mutual 
interests’ clause to their advantage, and likely would. The idea of such a “partnership” 
harked back to an earlier relationship between the United States and Cuba, in which the 
                                                        
83 U.S. Department of State. Possible Line to Take in Replying to Castro, Document 282.  
84 U.S. Department of State, Possible Line to Take in Replying to Castro, Document 282.  
39 
 
U.S. assumed it knew what was best for Cuba and denied Cuba any self-determination.   
 More than anything though, the central theme of each of the three of these State 
Department approaches was that United States wanted to step over Castro and appeal 
directly to the Cuban people.85 This was the plan because U.S officials realized along 
with Castro, that the people had won the revolution and there was power in the masses. 
Therefore, if the United States government could win the hearts and minds of the Cuban 
people, and appeal to their desires, they could secure a stake in the new revolutionary 
regime.  
 The CIA was also preparing their own suggestions on how to deal with Castro 
during his visit. Due to the stark contrast of approach and tone in the CIA’s document, it 
is unlikely that the State Department and the CIA were in dialogue with one another on 
this topic. The CIA briefed its members on Castro’s history, his ideology, and what they 
thought they could expect from him in the months to come. The CIA half-heartedly 
commended Castro for his dedication to the revolution and argued that he was able to 
achieve success because of his ability to produce and distribute effective propaganda, 
his systematic approach to radicalizing his government, his attempts to educate the 
young and rural peoples, and his forced emigration of his enemies. 86  Thus, the CIA did 
not list qualities like effective leadership, strategic military plans, or a population that 
trusted him to describe why he was victorious in his revolution. This is likely because 
the CIA either did not believe he had those qualities or believed he had them but was 
threatened by his victory and did not want to bolster Castro’s image any further.  
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The CIA then produced a confidential report prior to Castro’s visit to Washington. 
The report outlined things to keep in mind in case one was to cross paths with Castro 
during his visit. The report proposed no approach to dealing with Castro, but rather line 
items or reminders on why one should not trust Castro.  
The report from April 13, 1959 listed several alleged facts about Castro aimed to 
portray him in a bad light. The CIA anticipated that Castro would intend to put his best 
foot forward in Washington because he needed financial aid from the U.S. government 
in order to get his new regime off the ground. Without the aid, the CIA assumed that the 
new regime would collapse within a matter of months. In order to create the image that 
Castro and his revolutionaries were upstanding, civilized diplomats, the CIA predicted 
that Castro would bring Cuban businessmen and diplomats along to Washington as 
advisors, rather that fellow revolutionaries such as his brother Raul or friend and 
confidante Che Guevara. The CIA argued that bringing individuals like Raul and Che 
would too accurately represent the “bloodthirsty’ atmosphere of the revolution, and 
Castro knew that would work against him in dealing with the United States. 87 
The CIA also hinted in their report that communism, and communist ideals were 
circulating in Cuba. It pointed out that Castro’s popularity was steadily declining among 
the upper and middle class, but that he was still a hero to the peasant class. Castro 
allegedly vowed to create a single middle class by elevating the poor at the expense of 
the upper classes. Finally, the CIA argued that Castro allowed the known communists to 
infiltrate the military, labor force, cultural centers, and educational institutions.88  
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Therefore, the CIA wanted its members to be aware that though Castro was not a 
declared communist, that he did not necessarily oppose communism either.  
In the report, Allen Dulles suggested that Castro would go over the head of the 
U.S. State department in order to appeal to the American people.89 It is peculiar that 
Dulles would anticipate this course of action for Castro, because it was nearly exactly 
the same plan that the State Department intended to use on Castro. However, 
threatening that Castro would attempt to win over the American people, could have 
been simply Dulles’ attempt to justify circulating anti-Castro and anti-Cuban 
propaganda.  
The one thing that the CIA wanted the rest of the government to know prior to 
Castro’s arrival was that Castro was no friend to the United States. Dulles stated that 
Castro “has shown considerable unfriendliness toward the U.S. government. By half-
truths, exaggerations and outright lies, he has endeavored to whip up anti-Americanism 
in Cuba. Whether this is a result of deep personal prejudice or demagoguery to attract 
masses, has got to be proved.”90 
Castro’s visit to Washington D.C. from April 15, 1959 to April 26, 1959 was 
declared neither positive nor negative. He met with U.S. government officials during his 
stay and discussed a number of different issues. A few of which were his position on 
communism, his policies moving forward on American businesses in Cuba, and new 
democratic laws to be established in Cuba.  
Overall the State Department claimed that after Castro’s visit, that the man was 
still an enigma. Castro indicated that he intended to remain in the western camp, 
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meaning that his nation would not succumb to communism in the foreseeable future. He 
then explained some of his new ideas for land reform. These ideas worried the State 
department as they were somewhat rooted in leftist ideals due to their foundational 
principal: redistribution of property.  These new ideals made more than just the State 
Department uncomfortable. Businessmen and those owning property in Cuba were off 
put because it appeared that U.S. business in Cuba could be ousted if Castro’s new 
land reform policies were set in place.  
The State Department reported that Castro insisted his new regime was 
democratic. The masses positively reacted to his speeches, new legislation, and 
approved overall of his leadership. The State Department, however commented in their 
summary of the Castro meeting, that Castro may have confused the appreciable roar of 
audiences with the concept of representative democracy. They further advised that the 
government of the United States not underestimate Castro, because, as a result of his 
visit, he gained insight on the inner-workings of American government. The State 
Department also feared that Castro might radicalize his revolution further because 
Castro was more concerned with the ends than the means. 91  
During his eleven-day stay in the United States, Castro made several public 
appearances in addition to his discussions with officials like Vice President Nixon in 
Washington. Castro spoke at Princeton and Harvard and Columbia. He also delivered a 
two-hour speech in Central Park. In his speeches and presentations, he repeated one 
message numerous times. That message was that the Cuban revolution was “not for 
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export.” He preached that he nor his countrymen would assist in other Latin American 
revolutions, but he would encourage such countries, who needed a revolution, to let 
Cuba be their example. 92 This had been one of the greatest fears of the CIA, that 
Castro would encourage other Latin American Regimes to cast out imperialists and oust 
figurehead or “puppet” style governments. .93 The CIA especially feared this in nations 
already known to have communist infiltration. Therefore, Castro neither reinforced those 
fears, nor pacified them in his speeches in the States. The CIA would simply have to 
watch and wait.    
Castro departed for Cuba on April 26, 1959. When he arrived home to his island 
nation, he began planning his new Agrarian reform, which would become the first of 
many hot button issues between the United States and their neighbor to the south.  
 The basis of Castro’s Agrarian Reform was to take land from great landowners 
and redistribute that land to Cubans who owned little to no land. Immediately, the 
capitalists in charge of the U.S. government were unsettled by phrase “redistribution of 
wealth.” At first however, the American government was much more worried about what 
this new Agrarian Reform would mean for American companies who owned land in 
Cuba.  
 Castro claimed that there was a solution for those who would be stripped of a 
portion of their land. He promised that companies and individuals whose land was 
redistributed, would be monetarily compensated for their lost land. Castro reminded his 
nation that 
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We must declare, as we always have under such circumstances, that we make 
laws only for the benefit of the nation, even if these laws must sometimes 
damage certain interests.  We do not make laws by – hate, as we do not hate 
anybody.  We understand perfectly that we are a consequence of the past, we 
have the obligation to correct past mistakes.94  
 
 
 Therefore, Castro knew that this reform would be unpopular among some of his 
own countrymen but claimed that he was doing right by his country in pushing forward. 
However, landowners and businessmen did not see it that way. The new reform would 
be devastating to U.S. business in Cuba.  
 The market that would be especially damaged by Castro’s new regime was the 
sugar market. U.S. economists argued that not only would U.S. revenue from the sugar 
industry plummet, so would the production of sugar in Cuba if Castro followed through 
on the reforms. By redistributing big business, sugar producing land to the unskilled 
peasantry, sugar production will naturally decline. This is widely due to that fact that 
even if the unskilled peasantry had the means and ability to plant, grow, and harvest 
sugar cane, there would still be a lull in production as the large companies harvested 
the last of their sugar, and the peasants learned the skills necessary to begin a new 
cycle. The productivity decrease however, would not happen right away because sugar 
takes roughly eighteen months to fully ripen. U.S. officials were unsuccessful in their 
attempts to persuade Castro to reconsider his reform, because Castro later declared 
that expropriations of U.S. land would begin within a year’s time. 95 The Agrarian 
Reform Law officially went into effect on June 3, 1959.  The U.S was dissatisfied with 
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the compensation rate on lands to be appropriated from U.S. business owners, and they 
protest the reform. However, their protests were ignored96  
 Threatened by the reform, the U.S. set out over the summer and early fall of 
1959 to devise a plan to combat it. It was during this time in which Cuba lowered its 
national rates for electricity. This directly affected U.S. profits, as the Cuban Electric 
company was an American owned corporation. Infuriated by the loss of profits, coupled 
with the agrarian reform, the United States military went on to drop bombs on Cuban 
sugar plantations in October of 1959, just before a completed draft of the new policy 
towards Cuba was released to government officials.97 In the new policy towards Cuba, 
the State Department claimed that Castro’s new legislation and programs were not 
consistent with what the U.S. considered fair economic relations between the U.S. and 
Cuba. The U.S. was appalled by Castro’s appropriations of U.S. land, and criticized his 
left leaning ideologies.  
 The State Department also divulged to the CIA, the U.S Information Agency, 
the U.S Embassy in Cuba and the Office of International and National Security Affairs, 
that Castro allowed communists to penetrate many facets of society, including high 
offices of government. However, the State department also knew that Castro had won 
over the hearts and minds of most of his people, and they had a deep adoration for him. 
Therefore, U.S. officials needed to tread carefully when entertaining the possibility of 
forcing Castro to alter his policies, as doing so could have severe consequences and 
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more anti-American sentiments.  The U.S. needed an action plan to deal with what they 
considered to be an unstable and potentially hostile regime.98 
 A plan was devised by the State department to formalize a new policy towards 
Cuba to manage relations during this delicate time. The policy insisted that by the end 
of 1960, Cuba must meet the basic requirements in the OCB Regional Operations Plan 
for Latin America, which is the document governing U.S. policy goals toward Latin 
American nations. Second, the United States should assure Cuba that the chances of 
U.S. intervention were slim to none, unless the U.S. needed to defend its interests or 
principles. Third, the U.S should avoid at all costs, encouraging the consolidation of the 
Castro regime. Fourth, any policies designed to encourage opposition to Castro, and 
would likely be accepted by the Cuban people should be pursued. Finally, any materials 
promoting representative democracy in Latin America should also be pursued to the 
fullest extent possible. 99 Therefore, the State Department’s new policy on dealing with 
Cuba was to essentially cut the legs out from under Castro by turning his people against 
him and undermining his authority. Furthermore, spreading democratic ideals 
throughout Latin America was an attempt to contain the revolutionary ideals that made 
the new Cuban regime possible. These democratic ideals were also meant to contain 
the threat of communism that the U.S. perceived to be aggressively brewing in Cuba.  
 Castro however, had an answer for the United States. In October of 1959 
Castro had not declared allegiance to the socialist or communist party. Instead he 
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suggested in his speech at the loyalty rally, that the United States government was 
offended by the new revolutionary reforms because they interfered with U.S. Interests.  
He goes on to discuss how any move Cuba could make would interfere with foreign 
interests, whether it be producing new crops, instating revenue boosting trade tariffs, 
increasing their exports, or installing a mine, other nations would be vexed by it because 
such a move by Cuba could cut in on their profits. In his speech he calls out the United 
States specifically in his speech and stated the following:  
 
I ask: has the Revolutionary Government done anything that the people do not 
approve?  What has the Revolutionary Government done except defend the 
interests of the people?  What have we done except sacrifice ourselves for our 
country? In four centuries of Cuban history never has there been such an 
altruistic movement. . . Because our Revolutionary laws have an adverse effect 
on privileged classes inside Cuba and outside Cuba, they attack us and attack us 
and call us Communists.  They accuse us, trying to find some pretext to justify 
aggression against our country. 100  
 
 
Castro identified the United States officials as “wretched conspirators”, thus arguing that 
the presence of communism and communist ideals in Cuba were a scapegoat for the 
United States government to act aggressively towards Cuba. When the underlying 
reason for the aggression was the frustration the United States felt due to having lost 
control over the resources of a nation that once turned colossal profits for them.  
 The theory of U.S. leaders having used communism as a scapegoat to invade 
Cuba is one that is relatively unique to Castro. Even if perhaps some Americans had 
considered the possibility that U.S. officials were more afraid of losing profits than they 
were of communism as an ideology, no one would voice that opinion. During the fifties 
                                                        
100 Fidel Castro, “Speech to the People of Cuba at Loyalty Rally.” (Havana, Cuba), October, 26, 
1959. Latin American Information Center, 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1959/19591026.html 
48 
 
and sixties in America, the House of Un-American Activities Committee of “HUAC” as it 
was commonly called, was constantly searching for American citizens who had 
communist ideologies or were in some way tied to the communist party. If Americans 
were found to have communist affiliations, it oftentimes destroyed their careers and their 
reputations. Therefore, it is unlikely that any American would have voiced this opinion or 
agree with Castro on any matter.   
 Castro’s address to the people continued and in it, he suggested that United 
States wanted nothing more than to bring down the new revolutionary regime. He 
stated, “They want to destroy the revolution with their terrorism and by means of 
economic strangulation.  But the revolution is not just mine; the revolution belongs to the 
people and we are doing nothing but carry out the will of the people.”101 He pointed to 
economic strangulation as the strategy for the U.S. government’s plan to weaken Cuba. 
He was correct, however the “economic strangulation” Cuba had experienced up to that 
point was more of a gentle stifling, when compared to what was to come. Cuba had only 
seen the tip of the iceberg in regard to how far the United States would go to cripple the 
Cuban economy.  
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Chapter 3 
1960: Cutthroat Economics vs Military Force 
 
 Fidel Castro and his fellow revolutionary leaders wasted no time in enacting the 
terms of the agrarian reform. In January of 1960 Cuba expropriated over 70,000 acres 
of the land from the United States. None of which was accompanied by a monetary 
compensation. U.S. companies who owned property in Cuba were outraged by the 
expropriations.  U.S. Congress protested the seizure of land without compensation. Like 
their earlier attempts to stifle the agrarian reform, this new objection was similarly 
rejected by the Cuban government. As a result of Cuba’s refusal to adjust the terms of 
the agrarian reform, U.S. officials began entertaining the idea of cutting the sugar quota.  
 The sugar quota was a vitally important aspect in Cuban trade. Cuba held a 
special position with the United States in regard to trade. Cuba paid less duties than all 
other countries and had a guaranteed sugar quota that the United States would 
purchase from them each year.102  Sugar and sugar products comprised 79 percent of 
Cuban exports to the United States in 1960. These exports were a significant annual 
source of revenue for Cuba; 342 million dollars to be exact.103 If the sugar quota was 
cut, it would mean that the United States would no longer receive imported sugar from 
Cuba in the huge quantities it had in the past. Additionally, a cut in the sugar quota 
would likely devastate the Cuban economy because Cuba would have a copious supply 
of sugar, but no demand for it. U.S. officials in many government agencies believed that 
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cutting the sugar quota would be an effective tool in forcing Cuba to submit to their will. 
However, that was a decision the President was not prepared to make just yet.  
  U.S. executive officials instituted immediate retaliation against Cuba for 
declining to amend the agrarian reform. More bombs were dropped on Cuban sugar 
plantations buy the United States government. This time the bombs were not dropped in 
the rural country side, but rather on sugar plantations located in Havana province, close 
to the Cuba’s capital city. It was the goal of U.S. foreign policy leaders to incite fear 
among the Cuban people, in hopes that the people of Cuba would demand that Castro 
work with the United States, instead of against them.  
 In February, Castro responded to the protest by stating he was willing to create 
a council that could act as a mediator between the United States and Cuba, with the 
goal being to discuss all of the differences between the two nations. His proposal was 
contingent upon a promise that the United States would halt attacks and other 
measures of hostility while the discussions took place.  The offer was declined by the 
President because Washington received a tip that Castro agreed to sell twenty percent 
of Cuba’s sugar supply to the Soviet Union for the next five consecutive years. 104 
 In February of 1960 the CIA began to perceive the Soviet Union’s attitude 
towards Cuba was shifting from cautionary to supportive. This was affirmed with the 
Soviet Union’s allocation of $100,000,000 worth of economic aid credit. 105 The CIA 
reported that in the official communication records between Cuba and the Soviet Union 
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there was no mention of a promise to supply Cuba with arms, but the CIA expected an 
arms deal would certainly manifest in the future. 106 
 The trade and economic aid agreements between the Soviet Union and Cuba 
created even more tension than had already existed between the Cuba and the United 
States. Cuba had not declared itself communist as of the spring of 1960, but the 
growing relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union was one that could not bet 
ignored by the United States. The CIA drafted a briefing for the National Security 
Council, in which the CIA declared that the United States and Cuba could never have a 
friendly relationship if Fidel Castro remained in control. They claimed that Castro was 
influencing the media to whip up anti-American propaganda and the CIA feared for the 
lives of U.S. embassy employees stationed in Havana. The tensions were so high that 
they went so far as to devise an evacuation plan for embassy staff. 107 
 The briefing for the National Security Council also warned of Fidel Castro and 
Che Guevara’s opposition to foreign private investments in Cuba. The CIA claimed that 
the Cuban officials particularly condemned foreign industry. However, setting economic 
threats aside, the CIA further worried and anticipated that Castro would nationalize the 
land surrounding Guantánamo.108 It was believed that he was willing and able to 
remove American influence from Guantánamo because he so effortlessly removed 
American businesses from Cuba without compensation. The U.S. government seemed 
to be under the impression that Castro could and would do whatever he wanted and 
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wondered if he actually represented the desires of the Cuban people or if he was “just 
plain crazy.”109 
 Cuba however, understood that they needed to be careful about making any 
new decisions that negatively affected U.S. interests until they had assurance that they 
could be backed economically, industrially and militarily by another super power. The 
Soviet Union had already agreed to purchase twenty percent of Cuba’s sugar crop for 
the year to come, but Castro wanted an opportunity to see what benefits, other than 
direct profit, were to gain by initiating trade with the Soviet Union. Therefore, Cuba 
entered into a trade agreement with Poland. Poland, then part of the Soviet Bloc, 
offered Cuba technical aid, scientific assistance, and credit to purchase industrial 
machines and equipment. Cuba also started negotiating with Hungary, another member 
of the Soviet Bloc, to ensure opportunities to purchase machinery in the future. Castro 
also set in motion, a trade agreement for Russian crude oil. If fueling stations were set 
up in Cuba with Russian oil, Cuba would then become a vital base for naval trade, due 
to its convenient location in the central Caribbean. Therefore, an oil agreement 
benefitted both Cuba and the Soviet Union.  
 In addition to the trade agreements, Castro also had the intention of sending 
Cubans “from all walks of life” accompanied by several government officials, to visit the 
Soviet Union in April of 1960. The goal of the trip for the Cuban civilians was to witness 
a different way of life than their own. The government officials, however, had a different 
agenda. They were there to investigate the extent of the Soviet Union’s willingness to 
militarily support Cuba. The CIA suspected that Castro desperately wanted to figure out 
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how far the Soviet Union would go to protect Cuba, in case of a U.S. intervention. 110 
The number of trade agreements between Cuba and the Soviet Union signaled to the 
CIA that Cuba itself was on the verge of going red. 
 The U.S. State department, on the other hand, was not so quick to chalk up the 
entire regime as communist. The State Department preferred to analyze the situation in 
Cuba objectively by identifying and separating current threats from future threats. They 
pointed out and did not deny that communist groups were allowed to openly exist in 
Cuba and had indeed infiltrated multiple facets of society. However, they refused to 
believe that the Communist forces had swayed Castro further to the left.111 The State 
Department agreed with the CIA, by asserting that Castro would do anything he wanted 
without direction from foreign governments but were not convinced that he was a 
communist.  
 Additionally, the State Department added that the communists were certainly 
not strong enough to make a bid for power or the office of the prime minister. The 
suggested that the communists would avoid challenging Fidel for power and instead 
would center their efforts on covert infiltration in the government. The State Department 
also stated that Cuba in 1960 was not dominated by communists and they suggested 
that it would not be dominated by communists in the foreseeable future.112 However, 
they were leery that the more aggravated Fidel Castro became with the United States, 
the stronger his relationship with the Soviet Bloc would become. The State Department 
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also made the connection that the Soviet Bloc would likely not hesitate to use Cuba as a 
pawn in order to initiate a military confrontation with the United States.  
 The CIA’s opinion and the State Department’s opinion on communism was 
different because the CIA was convinced that Cuba’s relationship with the Soviet Union 
was a representation of Cuban ideology. The CIA’s logic was as follows: Cuba has 
trade agreements with the Soviet Union, therefore Cuba is communist. The State 
Department on the other hand would argue that it was feasible for the Cuban 
government to have democratic ideals and also have trade agreements with communist 
nations. The State Department acknowledged that there was indeed communist 
infiltration in Cuban society, but that it was not necessarily connected to the newfound 
friendships with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the State Department was thinking more 
broadly about Cuba and its unique position in global politics and economics, and thus 
arrived at the conclusion that Cuba’s relationship with the Soviet Union was more 
threatening than communist groups within Cuba, because that relationship with the 
Soviet Union could yield military confrontations between the U.S. and the USSR.  
 In April of 1960 the State Department sent Richard G. Cushing from the office 
of public affairs to Cuba to analyze anti-Castro groups, public opinion and the economy. 
He reported that in his opinion, the new Castro regime was a dictatorship and argued 
that the only difference between Castro’s Cuba and Batista’s Cuba is that it was left 
leaning rather than right leaning. Cushing observed that there was no identifiable, 
organized, opposition to Castro and that the communists were making progress and 
had successfully infiltrated society. As for the economy, it was on the decline, and it 
would only worsen if the United States cut the sugar quota. Many Cubans were worried 
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about what would happen if the U.S. did cut the sugar quota and were in favor of 
keeping relations with the United States good enough to still maintain trade 
agreements.113  
 Cushing also reported that public opinion for Castro had dwindled down from 
95% when he first became prime minister, down to roughly 50% by April of 1960. Most 
of the people who disapproved of Castro were in the middle to upper classes, but 
Cushing reported that Castro was also losing popularity amongst teachers as more 
Marxist materials became mandated in national curriculum. 114 From this report the 
State Department pieced together a morose picture of Cuban life and Cuba’s future.  
 Only twelve days after Cushing’s report to the State Department came one of 
the first documented discussions of overthrowing the Castro regime. Edward E Rice, a 
member of the State Department’s policy planning staff stated on April 13, 1960 “I hope 
and assume we are readying, for possible use, means for overthrowing the Castro 
regime; one should always have two strings to one’s bow.”115 By this Rice meant that 
the state department should start thinking about multiple action plans that could be 
taken to overthrow Fidel Castro. Rice and other U.S. government officials were also 
interested in overthrowing the neighboring regime of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican 
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Republic, but the Dominican was not U.S. foreign policy leaders’ first priority. Thus, Rice 
suggested that the State Department should consider a plan to overthrowing both 
regimes simultaneously because Trujillo was such a hated dictator, that the U.S. may 
have been able to capitalize on the distaste for Trujillo and use the support for 
overthrowing the Dominican Republic to help overthrow Cuba as well.116  
 The very next day, following Rice’s proposal, a security council meeting was 
held in Washington to discuss potential options for removing Castro. Instead of the 
State Department committing to the overthrow of an entire regime, it was likely more 
feasible to first try and get rid of one man. Three possible outcomes to the Cuban 
situation were identified at the meeting and they were “(1) the assassination of Castro, 
which would make him a martyr, (2) Castro’s suicide, which is a possibility in the event 
of failure and (3) a continuation of the present trend, resulting ultimately in a socialist 
dictatorship and a Batista-type terror in Cuba”.117 Therefore Castro’s suicide would have 
ultimately been the most ideal situation for members of the State Department and other 
governmental agencies who desired Castro’s overthrow. However, there was no way to 
ensure his suicide, and the State Department did not want to sit idly by as Cuba 
became socialist and its people suppressed. Thus, the option to assassinate Castro 
was the best choice for them, but official assassination plans had not yet been 
designed. Before they drafted official assassination plans, they first wanted to see how 
the rumored economic strangulation tactics against Cuba materialized. 
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 The State Department officially documented that they were entering into “stage 
3” in their dealings with Cuba on May 11, 1960. Assistant secretary of State Roy R. 
Rubottom identified three strategic stages that the U.S. government steered through 
since the start of the Cuban Revolution. The first stage was consisted of acknowledging 
the Castro regime and welcoming Castro to the United States on a visit. The goal of the 
first stage was to neutralize any hostilities and try to persuade Castro to discover and 
cultivate a more westernized ideology. Castro did not cooperate as well as U.S. officials 
would have hoped, so the State Department initiated stage two of their dealings with 
Cuba.  
 Stage two was titled the “policy of restraint” and it was designed to be more of 
an observatory stage in which the State Department was neither hostile nor 
exceptionally friendly to their southern neighbors. The goal in taking this quiet position 
was to allow Castro to destroy U.S.—Cuban relations on his own, with no U.S. 
retaliation. This would have ideally helped garner the support of the Cuban people, by 
leading them to believe that the United States was wronged by Castro, the U.S was 
undeserving of that treatment, and furthermore was merciful enough to not enact 
counter attacks against Cuba. The State Department had hoped that their policy of 
restraint would have distorted the Cubans’ view of their leader enough to jump ship and 
side with the United States. 
 By May of 1960 stages one and two had come and gone, and Rubottom 
suggested it was time to begin the third stage which requires that  
The United States use judiciously selected economic pressures at those points 
where Castro’s domestic and international policies have weakened Cuba’s 
economic structure in order to engender more public discomfort and discontent 
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and thereby to expose to the Cuban masses Castro’s responsibility for 
mishandling their affairs 118 
 
 Rubottom further identified the area that the United States must attack first: 
foreign exchange. He suggested sabotaging Cuba’s foreign trade because Cuba relied 
so heavily on imports, and their major export was sugar. The State Department first 
targeted the sugar quota because the United States was Cuba’s best customer in 
regard to sugar. It would take little effort on the part of U.S. government officials to cut 
the sugar quota and cripple the Cuban economy. That is what the situation was coming 
to in April of 1960. 
 The CIA on the other hand, had implemented plans of their own. While the 
State Department was experimenting with cut throat economics, the CIA began drafting 
plans for an invasion of Cuba. In late March of 1960, Eisenhower sent a secret letter to 
Allen Dulles, authorizing the CIA to begin planning for an invasion of Cuba. 119 The 
plans that the CIA began to draw up set the invasion date for the spring of 1961. This 
invasion would come to be known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. In the planning stages of 
the invasion, one thing was certain, air operations and air planes would play a key role 
in the attack. 120 
 The overall goal of the invasion was to “bring about the replacement of the 
Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and 
more acceptable to the U. S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U. S. 
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intervention.” 121 The CIA aimed to orchestrate a scheme to oust Fidel Castro and his 
fellow revolutionaries and replace their regime with a new one which would be better for 
Cubans and friendlier to America. The goal was for the CIA to control all actions both 
inside and outside of Cuba and do so undetected by Castro and his officials.  
 In order to realize these goals, the CIA developed a four-step program to 
outline the major courses of action for the invasion. The first thing that the CIA identified 
as a necessary accessory to the plan were a group of anti-Castro Cubans who could 
unify, organize, and responsibly carry out orders from the CIA in order to carry out an 
overthrow the Castro regime. The CIA had been in contact with three opposition groups 
within Cuba and aimed to consolidate their efforts to form a military junta, united under 
the slogan “Restore the Revolution.”122 This slogan was meant to insinuate that the 
Castro Regime had veered off from the original values of the revolution and now was a 
dangerous detriment to society. The slogan was also effective in communicating the 
message that what the United States was orchestrating was a positive movement for 
Cuba. Therefore, it helped frame the junta in a positive way, making it an appealing, or 
at the very least competitive political alternative to Castro’s regime.  
 The next step in the program involved creating an avenue for mass 
communication of the opposition’s ideals and for the distribution of anti-Castro 
propaganda. The CIA decided that the best way deliver the information was through 
long and short-wave radio broadcasts. The location from which the broadcasts were to 
be released from was a broadcasting facility on Swan Island off the coast of Honduras. 
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The broadcasts were designed to be accompanied by written material and pamphlets 
dispersed secretively throughout the nation. 123 
 The CIA’s third step in the action plan was to appoint a covert intelligence force 
to serve as an intermediary between the United States and the opposition. The desired 
outcome of the intelligence intermediary was to provide constructive and reliable intel on 
the status of the Castro regime and the progress of the opposition force. The 
intermediary was also responsible for orchestrating the distribution of illegal, pro-
opposition propaganda within the nation of Cuba. Finally, such an intelligence force 
would also recruit valuable individuals to join the opposition.  
 The last step in the process involved organizing a paramilitary training base for 
cadres to be prepped for deployment into Cuba. The goal of this unofficial, semi-
militarized force would ultimately be to lead an insurrection in Cuba that would result in 
the overthrow of the Castro regime. The CIA began searching for locations outside the 
United States and Cuba which would be safe and undetectable sites for cadre training 
facilities. 124 Thus, the CIA had bypassed economic strangulation tactics and moved 
more in the direction of military force. 
 In the spring of 1960, the State Department and the CIA’s approaches to 
handling Cuba differed greatly. The State Department initiated cut throat economics, 
starting with a conversation of terminating the sugar quota, whereas the CIA designed a 
plan to combat the Cuban situation with military force. It would seem that the State 
Department in 1960 had not yet abandoned diplomacy and finesse as options for 
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settling the differences between two nations. The CIA on the other hand adopted 
Theodore Roosevelt’s famous proverb: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” 125 
 Though the State Department and CIA’s tactics were different, the two 
agencies still were aware of each other’s plans and often made decisions together. By 
June of 1960 both the State Department and the CIA believed that it would be nearly 
impossible to have a friendly relationship with Cuba in the foreseeable future. They 
further both agreed that the situation in Cuba had to change and removing Castro from 
office was the best thing for the future of the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba.  
 The State Department, however, was not as aggressive as the CIA, and had 
not drafted any assassination plans or plans to overthrow the regime as of June 1960. 
Whereas the CIA had set plans in motion to overthrow the Castro regime. The State 
Departments opted for a more relaxed approach and argued that the United States 
government had to this point, minimally cooperated with the Cuban government, while 
offering enough cooperation to maintain the illusion to both American citizens and 
Cuban citizens, that trade relations were healthy. They also argued that they had made 
it a point to not silence Castro’s anti-U.S. sentiments, lending him the opportunity to 
show his true colors to the rest of the world. 126  Therefore, the State Department aimed 
to make it appear as though Castro alone had sabotaged the relationship between the 
United States and Cuba, and the U.S. would come out looking like the victim.  
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 It was in June of 1960 that the State Department became reasonably sure that 
Castro had indeed succumbed to the communists and was himself an undeclared 
communist. This observation helped to sway congress to set in motion an amendment 
of the sugar act, which included a clause on authorizing the president to cut the sugar 
quota for the remainder of 1960.  The State Department was cautious in its discussions 
on cutting the sugar quota because the 1943 bilateral trade agreement between the 
United States and Cuba required a six-month notice for terminating the trade of any 
specific good. Terminating the agreement with disregard for the six-month notice could 
be a risky move because it would send the message to Cuba that the United States 
government refused to be fair.  However, there was a way for the United States to elude 
the six-month notice obligation: by having the president declare a “state of emergency” 
and implement the Trading with the Enemy Act. This would immediately halt all trade 
between the two nations. The drawback of such a move is that it would be quite 
aggressive and also would commit the United States to labeling Cuba an official enemy. 
Identifying Cuba as an enemy prior to Castro declaring the nation communist could 
cause potential problems in the future and would cause the United States to appear 
quarrelsome, which is the opposite image the State Department was aiming to project.  
 The State Department anticipated that declaring a state of emergency or 
instituting the sugar amendment might cause Castro to retaliate by expropriating U.S. 
owned oil refineries, and sugar mills. If Castro chose to retaliate in this way, the State 
Department planned to urge other government officials and agencies to “refrain from 
any extreme overt retaliation, [this way] we would be the aggrieved party.” 127 
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 Secretary Anderson of the U.S. Treasury agreed that the United States should 
refrain from retaliation in the event Castro expropriated U.S. properties and businesses. 
However, he along with Secretary of State Christian Herter believed that the cut in the 
sugar quota alone would not solve anything and suggested “going all the way” and 
eliminating all trade with Cuba. He argued that eliminating the trade of one product at a 
time would allow Castro time to pick up the slack in between each economic blow.  
Thus, it would have little overall effect on the economy. Secretary Anderson argued that 
“Nibbling is no good; we should either take actions which will hurt or leave well enough 
alone.” 128 The State Department as a whole chose to neither implement solely the 
sugar amendment nor “go all the way”. Instead they opted for a plan that provided 
continuous economic blows in quick succession as to not allow Cuba the chance to 
recover between each act of economic sabotage. The State Department insisted that  
It is important that the U.S. Government maintain its dignity and that any action 
which it may take should not be as a result of a stampede or panic; it should 
be, rather, a relentless, firm pressure, a steady turning of the screw, in a spirit 
of lamentation and sorrow rather than anger. . . we should try to use economic 
bullets rather than real ones. 129 
  
 On June 27, 1960, congress initiated the push to pass an amended sugar act 
including a passage which would allow President Eisenhower to eliminate the sugar 
quota all together. The U.S State Department’s assumptions were realized two days 
later, on June 29, 1960, when Fidel Castro nationalized all oil refineries owned by U.S. 
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companies which included Texaco, Shell and Esso.130 This came earlier than 
anticipated. The State Department projected that Castro would expropriate American oil 
refineries after the sugar quota was cut. It appeared Fidel Castro was wasting no time 
and was aggressively perusing the goals of his revolution. The oil refineries, however, 
were only the tip of the iceberg. On July 5, 1950 Castro nationalized all U.S owned 
businesses and commercial property in Cuba.131 President Eisenhower then had no 
choice but to act.  
 One day after Castro nationalized the U.S. businesses, President Eisenhower 
declared the cut of the sugar quota. In numbers, this meant that the U.S. government 
officially declined to purchase 700,000 tons of sugar from Cuba in the 1960 calendar 
year. The United States government did not give Cuba a six-month notice and did not 
declare a state of emergency. Rather, the President cut the sugar quota disregarding 
any courtesies outlined in previous trade agreements, as a result of Castro’s recent 
appropriations of U.S. businesses and property.  The President stated:  
Normally about one-third of our total sugar supply comes from Cuba. Despite 
every effort on our part to maintain traditionally friendly relations, the Government 
of Cuba is now following a course which raises serious questions as to whether 
the United States can, in the long run, continue to rely upon that country for such 
large quantities of sugar. I believe that we would fail in our obligation to our 
people if we did not take steps to reduce our reliance for a major food product 
upon a nation which has embarked upon a deliberate policy of hostility toward 
the United States. 132 
 
 The President continued by announcing that the U.S. would give their business 
to other countries on the world market to replace the 700,000 tons of sugar they 
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declined to purchase from Cuba. He further announced that the decision to cut the 
sugar quota was also influenced by the claim that Cuba had been trading with the 
Soviet Union and was using sugar as a currency. With that in mind the President was 
unsure how long Cuba would have been able to continue exporting sugar to the U.S. if 
they were shipping mass quantities to the Soviets. Thus, the President claimed he and 
fellow government officials including economic analysts were uncomfortable relying on 
Cuba because the United States would face a sugar shortage if Cuba were to run out of 
sugar. President Eisenhower closed his address by stating “The American people will 
always maintain their friendly feelings for the people of Cuba. We look forward to the 
day when the Cuban Government will once again allow this friendship to be fully 
expressed in the relations between our two countries.”133 The President’s aspiration to 
reconcile with Cuba proved to be an unrealistic goal in the summer of 1960. Three days 
after Eisenhower cut the sugar quota, the Soviet Union emerged from behind their iron 
curtain to deliver a message to the United States. 
 On July 9, 1960 Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier announced  “If 
necessary, Soviet artillery men can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if 
aggressive forces dare to start an intervention against Cuba” and followed that 
statement by agreeing to purchase from Cuba,  the 700,000 tons of sugar that was 
designated to be sold to the United States.134 Che Guevara and Fidel Castro made 
statements regarding the Soviet embrace of their regime. Guevara boasted “Cuba today 
is a glorious island defended by the rockets of the greatest military power in history. . 
.We are practically the arbiters of world peace.” Fidel on the other hand used 
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Khrushchev’s statement to boast of the greatness of the Cuban people and their ideals. 
He stated, “Cuba does not depend for the defense of its sovereignty and independence 
on Soviet rockets, but rather on the reason and justice of its cause.” 135  
 While the CIA estimated that many Cubans from the educated and elite class 
were opposed to the alliance with the Soviet Union, they argued that Cuba inched 
closer every day, to becoming a dictatorship run by communists. Finally, the CIA feared 
that Castro would put the good of the people second to his “greater ambition—
humiliation of [the] U.S., wrecking of [the] inter-American system and eventual 
‘liberation’ of all Latin America.”136 
  After Khrushchev’s warning and subsequent comments by Cuban leaders, the 
CIA reported that these recent events “plunged US-Cuban relations into their most 
critical phase to date.”137 The CIA also feared that the recent events in Cuba had ignited 
a new fire in Castro’s anti-American campaign and increased national support of the 
revolution. Furthermore, the CIA realized that cutting the sugar quota did not have the 
debilitating effect on the Cuban economy like the U.S. government had hoped. Instead, 
terminating the sugar quota only increased Cuba’s dependency on the Soviet Union. 
Given the circumstances, the CIA believed that Castro was certainly more likely to sever 
all ties with the United States than he was to back down from the fight and restore 
relations. 138 Angered and frustrated, officials in the U.S. government sought to submit a 
complain to the United Nations and the Organization of American States suggesting that 
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two agencies examine the current situation in Cuba. Such a move, however, would not 
produce any tangible results, and would likely aggravate Castro further. Therefore, the 
CIA decided it was time something be done to eliminate Castro.  
 In August of 1960 the CIA began taking measures to plan the assassination of 
Fidel Castro. The first plan, designed in early August, involved recruiting men from the 
American mafia and the criminal underworld assist in the planning. The man chosen 
was Robert Maheu, an ex-FBI agent who the CIA considered “tough enough” for the 
job. Robert Maheu asked the CIA if he could enlist the help of John Rosselli, a fellow 
American with Las Vegas underworld connections to assist him. The CIA obliged. With 
the help of the CIA Maheu and Rosselli began planning the assassination and recruited 
Cubans who opposed Castro to commit the official assassination. The assassination 
was to be executed by dropping a poisoned pill into Castro’s food or drink and was 
planned to be carried out in November of 1960. From 1960 to 1965 there were at least 
eight known attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro in which the CIA was involved. 
Besides the poisoned pills, there were also poisoned cigars, bacterial powders, a 
poisoned pen and attacks involving more traditional weapons such as guns.139 
 In the meantime, while the CIA set in motion plans for an assassination, the 
rest of the U.S. government prepared for Fidel Castro’s arrival in New York for the 
United Nations conference in September of 1960. On September 26, Castro made a 
four-hour address to the United Nations. In his speech he covered the colonial history of 
Cuba up to Batista’s rule, retold the story of the revolution, and announced both the 
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economic and militaristic assaults on Cuba since he became the leader of the nation. 
He also went on to describe the ways in which the quality of life for Cubans had greatly 
improved since Batista’s overthrow. Castro then opened his verbal onslaught of the 
United States with the following passage: “It has been proved that revolutions do not 
ruin countries, and that imperialist governments do try to ruin countries. Cuba had not 
been ruined; she therefore had to be ruined.”140 He then went on to deliver a play by 
play of the relationship between the United States and Cuba since he took the position 
of Prime Minister and began enacting new legislation for Cuba. When he arrived at the 
delicate topic of drafting trade agreements with the Soviet Union he stated, “We really 
did not have to ask permission from the State Department in order to sign a trade treaty 
with the Soviet Union, because we considered ourselves, and we continue to consider 
ourselves, and we will always consider ourselves, a truly independent and free 
country.”141 In the rest of his speech he maneuvered through Cuba’s position on other 
international issues like the 1960 status of the Congo and the Republic of China’s 
admission into the United nations. Finally, he ended his address by declaring Cuba’s 
position on international politics and foreign relations: “We are, and always shall be for 
everything that is just: against colonialism, exploitation, monopolies, militarism, the 
armaments race, and warmongering. We shall always be against such things. That will 
be our position.” 142It was with that statement that Castro exited the United Nations 
meeting and left home to Cuba two days later. Upon arriving home Castro was met with 
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more aerial bombs from the United States and in mid-October, he filed a formal 
complaint to the United Nations against the United States for aerial aggression.  
 From the CIA’s perspective, Castro had become a bigger threat than ever. The 
CIA reported in October of 1960 that Cuba had received large arms shipments from the 
Soviet Union. Some of the specific items reported to have been delivered to Havana 
harbor were rocket arms, small electric plants, radar equipment, aircraft parts, 
bazookas, long-range reflectors and other small weapons. 143 Therefore, the plan to 
assassinate Castro was vitally important to the CIA in the fall of 1960. They had 
arranged for one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to be paid to the men who 
successfully delivered poisoned pills to Castro. The official plan was to get the poisoned 
pills to men within Cuba who had access to Castro and instruct them to contaminate 
Castro’s food with the pills. The CIA reported that they insisted on using poisoned pills 
because they would not be able to convince anyone to accept the mission if they were 
mandated to use gunfire because their own chance of survival would have been slim. 
The plan to assassinate Castro in the fall of 1960 fell through because the CIA could not 
get their personnel and syndicates organized quickly enough to finish the job.144 
Therefore they waited in the wings for another opportunity.  
 The State Department on the other hand, again chose to not engage in violent 
acts against Cuba, but rather to initiate more economic attacks. The State Department 
drafted an action plan and presented it to President Eisenhower on October 13, 1960. 
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The plan was to prohibit all U.S. exports to Cuba with the exception of medical supplies 
and staple food stuffs. Officials in the State Department did not believe that such 
embargo could end the Castro regime, but it would put added pressure on Cuban 
government officials. Additionally, it would not be categorized as an “intervention” so as 
not to initiate any military confrontation from the Soviet Union. There were a couple of 
cons associated with the State Departments proposed plan. First, the president was 
concerned with the reaction of other Latin American countries. Any that had strong 
communist movements would be disgruntled over the matter and the president hoped 
that they could justify the embargo well enough to avoid criticism. The second problem 
is that the President feared that the proposed embargo would appear to be an attack on 
the Cuban people, rather than an attempt to cripple the Castro regime.145 The State 
Department did not want the Cuban people to feel abandoned, which is why they 
proposed to make exceptions for exports of medical supplies and staple foods. The 
President hoped he could frame the embargo in such a way that it would not cause 
violent retaliation from any party.  
 President Eisenhower enacted the partial embargo on U.S. exports to Cuba on 
October 19, 1960 and, in response, Castro nationalized the rest of American properties 
in Cuba on October 24, 1960.146 In the weeks following the partial embargo, Cuba and 
the Soviet Union caught wind of a plan for the United States to invade Cuba and 
reported it to the United Nations. The United Nations responded by stating that Cuba’s 
charges against the United States were “monstrous distortions and downright 
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falsehoods” and argued that the United States posed no threat to Cuba. It is curious that 
the United Nations believed that the United States posed no threat to Cuba because a 
vast amount of information on the impending Cuban invasion had been leaked from the 
U.S. government. Castro had received evidence from informants that the United States 
had organized training bases in Guatemala to prepare a Cuban opposition force for an 
invasion. The State Department was rattled by the intelligence leak and as a result 
proposed moving the trainings out of Guatemala and establishing training centers in the 
United States that could provide more security. 147 However, in late November of 1960, 
President elect John F. Kennedy was briefed on the official invasion plan of Cuba.  
 By the first week of December of 1960 the State Department received a 
dispatch from the Embassy in Cuba containing hard truths about the reality of the 
relationship between the United States and Cuba. Due to the contents of the dispatch 
the State Department came to terms with the fact that conciliation was not an option to 
solving the problems between the two nations. They also realized that time would not 
solve the problem because Cuba had not felt the sting of the economic blows because 
they received immediate economic support from the Soviet Union. Finally, the State 
Department believed that an armed invasion would not likely be successful because 
Castro has extended “government control over all aspects of the economic and social 
structure, [enacted] massive and skillful use of propaganda and drastically suppressed 
all individual liberties.”148 In order for the United States to obtain a desired outcome in 
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Cuba, the government needed to pursue one of three options. The first was to negotiate 
a settlement with Cuba to meet the demands of each country. The second was to 
continue to observe the Cuban situation under the assumption that an opposition force 
will push for new policies in Cuba. The third option was for the United States to 
orchestrate the overthrow of Fidel Castro. 149 
 The State Department chose to go with the third option. This option aligned 
closely with the CIA’s plan to invade Cuba, which had been in the works since the 
Spring of 1960.  However, the State Department’s approach to overthrowing the Castro 
regime was slightly different. The State Department laid out three steps to fulfilling the 
goal. The first was to further tighten economic sanctions against Cuba. Next, they would 
prepare and distribute massive amounts of Anti-Castro propaganda, followed by the 
termination of all diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba. Lastly, the State 
department would encourage and strengthen the Cuban opposition force.150 Their 
approach is still different from the CIA’s because the CIA used a hands-on strategy and 
organized the official training of opposition forces, whereas the State Department opted 
for a hands-off approach acting as the opposition’s glorified cheerleaders.  
 In mid-December of 1960 the State Department began having conversations 
about terminating diplomatic relations with Cuba. There were two unfortunate cons to 
breaking diplomatic ties. First was that the U.S. Embassy was valuable in forwarding 
intelligence on Cuba’s military, economy, and policy changes to United States officials 
in Washington D.C. If relations ceased, the U.S. officials would not have as much 
access to Cuban intel and would instead have to rely mostly on anti-Castro informants. 
                                                        
149 U.S. Department of State, Despatch from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, 1.  
150 U.S. Department of State, Despatch from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, 1. 
73 
 
Second was that American embassy in Cuba served as a physical symbol of the 
resistance to the Castro regime. A vacant embassy would send the message that the 
United States had given up the fight and had abandoned any anti-Castro Cubans still 
left on the island.  
 Despite the downsides, the State Department was easily persuaded to favor a 
break in diplomatic relations for a number of reasons. First, they realized that tighter 
policies had made it more difficult for the Embassy in Cuba to distribute information to 
Cuban citizens, thus the embassy did them little good in communicating to the people. 
Second, since Castro had nationalized all U.S. properties in Cuba, U.S. businesses had 
little influence over the decision to maintain diplomatic relations.  Third, most of the anti-
Castro Cubans had already left Cuba or had decided to leave in the coming months 
which meant that the U.S. had few friends left on the island.  Finally, breaking diplomatic 
ties with Cuba would cause the United States less embarrassment in the long run 
because any U.S. backed invasion wouldn’t be as ill-received by the rest of the world if 
the United States and Cuba had no diplomatic relationship.151  The year 1960 ended 
with diplomatic relations between the United States in Cuba still in-tact, but that was to 
be short lived.  
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Chapter 4 
Kennedy, Castro, & Combat 
 
 Diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba finally broke on 
January 3, 1961.152 This meant that the two countries would no longer have any formal 
dealings or communication and would not have government workers stationed in each 
other’s nations. Therefore, the Kennedy administration had their work cut out for them 
because they would have no access to intel directly from Cuba and would have to 
strategically gather information from secret informants.  
 President-elect John F. Kennedy met with President Eisenhower on the eve of 
Kennedy’s inauguration to discuss the Cuban situation. Eisenhower informed Castro 
that the United States had organized an opposition movement and band of cadres 
scheduled to invade Cuba with the intent of overthrowing the Castro regime. He detailed 
that the cadres were being trained in a remote facility in the interior of Guatemala and 
were on track to initiate an invasion in the spring of 1961. He urged Kennedy to pursue 
and accelerate the program and invasion plan. Finally, Eisenhower left Kennedy with his 
formidable opinion that the Castro administration could continue to exist in Cuba for 
long without becoming dangerous, possibly lethal to the United States.153  
 During Kennedy’s inaugural address, he tactfully stated his position on 
communism, the Soviet Union and Cuba, without directly calling upon certain groups or 
countries. He stated:  
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Let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of 
its own house. . . Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our 
adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the 
quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science 
engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction. 154 
 
 
 In this passage, Kennedy pointed out that it was his goal to maintain 
democracy in the Western Hemisphere and to not let forces from the East creep in and 
take over his “house.” Kennedy essentially equates the United States with the entire 
Western Hemisphere. Thus, positioning the United States as the leader and policing 
agent of the Western Hemisphere. He then followed up by offering a proposal to work 
on mending relationships with enemy countries before the threat of nuclear war arises. 
Castro listened in as Kennedy delivered his proposal to “begin anew” with Cuba and 
Castro welcomed Kennedy’s proposal. He even went so far as to demobilize the Cuban 
militia because he assumed there was no longer a threat for a U.S. invasion.155 To his 
dismay, Kennedy had not recalled the invasion plans and had not decelerated the 
invasion’s timeline.  
 The propaganda campaign in Cuba was still high on the list of priorities for the 
CIA and the National Security Council. They intensified their original plan of radio 
broadcasts and pamphlets as the main methods of propaganda distribution. The 
propaganda was meant primarily to encourage anti-Castro Cubans to stay confident 
and to encourage more people to join the fight against the Castro regime, especially in 
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the months leading up to the invasion. 156 However, much of the distributed materials 
actually had the opposite effect. United States officials believed more of the propaganda 
than the Cubans, and many Cubans were rather offended by the propaganda because 
Castro had renewed historic nationalism in the people of Cuba. Therefore, many 
Cubans did not buy into the propaganda distributed by opposition groups or the United 
States. Much of the Invasion planned by the CIA was done so with CIA officials under 
the impression that there was opposition against Castro already brewing in the island.157 
In hindsight however, that was not the case.  
 By March of 1961 the CIA had an intricate plan laid out for anti-Castro forces to 
invade Cuba. They called the mission “Operation Zapata.” The invasion date was set for 
mid-April of 1961. The CIA chose Playa Girón, or the “Bay of Pigs” for numerous 
reasons. The first was that the landscape surrounding the coast was filled with mostly 
wetland, filled with bogs and swamp. This would make it a difficult location for Castro to 
defend because vehicles could not navigate through the terrain. The CIA also favored 
the Bay of Pigs over other locations because it was centrally located on the island. This 
was beneficial because if the opposition was victorious, a central location such as the 
Bay of Pigs was an ideal epicenter from which anti-Castro sentiments to spread 
throughout the island. Lastly, the Bay of Pigs offered multiple landing zones for aircrafts. 
There were two landing strips nearby and a few strips of beach that could serve as 
landing strips if needed. 158 
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 The time of the initial landing was planned to be at night as to allow the most 
time for unloading supplies before being discovered by Castro’s militia. The assault of 
Castro’s air force was to begin the following morning. After Castro’s air force was 
destroyed, the CIA’s next step was to move the command ships into the harbor of the 
bay. They estimated that within seventy-two hours of the initial attack, the fighting would 
cease, and the U.S. could set up a provisional government at Playa Girón. 159 
 The Department of Defense evaluated the plan proposed by the CIA and 
pointed out potential disadvantages of the mission. First, the Chiefs of Staff identified 
that the landing strips surrounding Playa Girón were inadequate for B-26 planes. 
Second, there was no air operations base factored into the plan therefore, anticipating 
oncoming air attacks from Castro’s forces would be difficult and nearly impossible. 
Third, they argued that it would be difficult for amateur pilots with minimal training to 
navigate at night and successfully execute a landing. 160 However, though there were 
risks and disadvantages to the plan, it was the best plan the U.S. Government had. 
Thus, they pursued it and continued to prepare for the invasion, which was only one 
month away.  
 Only five short days before the attack, the President’s special assistant Arthur 
Schlesinger reported to the president, his concerns about the operation and what it 
would mean for the United States—win or lose. He encouraged Kennedy to stall the 
invasion so there was more time to adequately plan. He was concerned that the 
                                                        
159 Central Intelligence Agency, Revised Cuba Operation, 3.  
160 Department of Defense, Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara: Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternative Concepts, CIA Para-military Plan, Cuba 
(S), Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1962, Volume X, JCSM 166-61, Document 62, 
(Washington, D.C.), March 15, 1961.   
78 
 
planning, beyond the initial attack, was lacking critical elements. He suggested including 
political, diplomatic and economic plans which could be set in motion after the 
provisional government was established, and such plans should be drafted by May 1, 
1961. The absence of these plans would likely cause much confrontation from 
revolutionary Cubans, and much criticism from the world. He went on to say such a 
forceful invasion should only be initiated if Cuba presented a “demonstrable and 
convincing” threat to U.S. national security, which Schlesinger was skeptical about. He 
reported:  
 
A great many people simply do not at this moment see that Cuba presents so 
grave and compelling a threat to our national security as to justify a course of 
action which much of the world will interpret as calculated aggression against a 
small nation in defiance both of treaty obligations and of the international 
standards we have repeatedly asserted against the Communist world.161 
 
Thus, Schlesinger suggested to president Kennedy, that the United States 
government would appear hypocritical if they invaded Cuba because they so intensely 
criticized communist nations for violations of international standards. He was immensely 
concerned about the image of the United States and the image of the Kennedy 
administration. He additionally pointed out that Kennedy had changed the way 
Americans thought about government and had impacted foreign relations in a positive 
way. Further he described the government under Kennedy as one that has emerged 
“again as a great, mature and liberal nation, coolly and intelligently dedicated to the job 
of stopping Communism, strengthening the free and neutral nations and working for 
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peace.”162  In order to preserve the positive image of the Kennedy administration and of 
the U.S. as a whole, Schlesinger urged Kennedy to reconsider Operation Zapata and 
encouraged him to objectively weigh the pros and cons of pursuing the invasion. Finally, 
he added “people will assume that our action is provoked by a threat to something other 
than our security. . . they will assume that we are acting, not to protect our safety, but to 
protect our property and investments.”163 
Schlesinger was not alone in his concerns and was also not alone in his opinion 
that Operation Zapata should be reconsidered. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles 
believed that U.S. national interests would not benefit from a cover operation like the 
one the CIA planned against Cuba. He suggested that the world’s opinion of Kennedy 
was too high to jeopardize over an operation from which he suggested there was little to 
gain. Bowels also brought up another point made by Schlesinger: the hypocrisy of it all. 
He cited the Act of Bogota, signed in September of 1960 in the Organization of 
American States agreements. It stated: 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The 
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of 
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its 
political, economic and cultural elements.164 
 
Therefore, Bowels, of the U.S. State Department, argued that the United States should 
keep to its word and keep out of Cuba. It would be difficult to condemn the communists 
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for building empires, if the United States were invading countries who arguably posed 
little threat to U.S. national security. He commented on how treaty conditions should be 
recognized as binding law, and that President Kennedy had garnered much world 
support by being a man of principle.  
  Other members of the State Department such as Assistant Secretary of 
State Thomas Mann opposed the invasion. Mann was skeptical about the invasion and 
suggested that garnering enough support for an uprising against the Castro regime was 
an unrealistic goal because Castro had already garnered the support of most Cubans 
on the Island. Many government officials underestimated how many Cubans truly 
supported Castro.165 In addition to Mann, Senator J. William Fulbright made the 
comment that “The Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh, but it is not a dagger to the 
heart.”166 Therefore Fulbright viewed Cuba as more of an annoyance than a violent 
country posing a threat to the United States.  
 It is apparent that U.S. government officials had differing opinions on whether or 
not to invade Cuba. Allen Dulles and the CIA were neck deep in their invasion plans and 
were committed to act on them, while other government officials offered several reasons 
to abandon the mission. Nonetheless, it appears that no government officials opposed 
the mission because they believed it was wrong to invade Cuba but were instead 
worried that the invasion would end in failure or that the reputation of the United States 
would be tarnished as a result of the coup.  
 From the time Castro took over Cuba, the State Department and the CIA had 
differing opinions on how the new revolutionary regime should be handled. The State 
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Department erred on the side of caution and aimed to solve issues between the United 
States and Cuba diplomatically, rather than using methods of aggression such as an 
invasion. In contrast, the CIA began planning Operation Zapata during the Eisenhower 
administration, before Castro nationalized U.S. oil refineries, before Castro nationalized 
all U.S. businesses, and before Cuba established concrete sugar trade agreements with 
the Soviet Union.  CIA Director Allen Dulles was consumed by the task of containing 
communism and determined the timing of Castro publicly declaring himself a communist 
to be irrelevant because Dulles insisted Castro’s regime was flooded with communist 
underpinnings all along.167 Therefore Dulles believed that communism existed in Cuba, 
regardless of whether or not the leader of the movement was a declared communist. 
These facts illustrate that the CIA’s decision to overthrow the Castro regime was 
made prior to the occurrence of many serious points of contention between the United 
States and Cuba throughout 1960. Thus, the decision to invade was based on the 
presumption of communism and the threat that a full communist takeover of Cuba would 
result in a loss of profit for the United States. Therefore, the CIA felt the need to “nip it in 
the bud” and overthrow Castro before he had the chance to strip the United States of its 
investments in Cuba. Dulles had a “do onto others before they do it to you” mentality. 
The CIA thus favored military coup, rather than a diplomatic avenue from the start and 
by April of 1961 their plan was ready to be set in action. The attempts made by the 
State Department and other government officials to stall or stop the invasion were 
ineffective, as the CIA decided not to recall their plan to invade Cuba. Therefore, the 
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CIA made their final adjustments to the plan, and prepared the opposition force for 
battle.  
 The invasion officially began on April 15, 1961. The opposition arrived in the 
night and staged a series of air attacks on Cuban military targets. The goal in beginning 
the invasion with an air attack was to destroy military equipment and arms in hopes that 
Castro and his revolutionary militia would not be able to adequately fend off the attack. 
The CIA logically presumed that if Cuban planes were destroyed, it would be more 
difficult for the Cuban revolutionaries to defend themselves against an assault from 
opposition forces. However, Cuba’s military equipment withstood the attack and 
Castro’s aircrafts, his most valuable weapons, emerged unscathed. 168 
 Arguably one of the devastating mistakes of the ground invasion was that the 
Cuban exiles waited two days after the airstrike to begin their attack on land. Because 
Castro’s air force was not destroyed by the initial air attack, the two-day lull gave 
Castro’s forces time to organize and respond.  Therefore, on the night of April 17, 1961 
when the opposition made their land attack and converged on Playa Girón, the Cuban 
revolutionaries were ready to strike back. Regardless of the odds, the opposition fought 
valiantly and trekked inland for two days, taking constant abuse from Castro’s tanks and 
heavy artillery. By the end of the day on April 19, 1961 Castro’s forces had pushed the 
opposition back to Playa Girón, the beach from which they attacked. The command 
ships stationed in the harbor sent many messages to the CIA communicating that they 
needed help, were out of ammunition, and were quickly running out of manpower. The 
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troops repeatedly begged for help from the United States government and their pleas 
went unanswered by President Kennedy who declined to admit the United States had 
any involvement in the plot to invade Cuba.  
 The command ships stationed in the harbor sent one final message to the CIA 
before being destroyed by an assault from Castro’s air force. That message was 
“Castro is waiting on the beach.”169 With that, the opposition’s command ships were 
destroyed, their extra ammunition, arms and other materials were sunk in the bay, and 
their fight was in its final hour. At that point, the practicality of a successful completion of 
the mission declined quickly and Castro’s forces easily defeated the opposition, 
resulting in an embarrassing defeat for the anti-Castro invaders. 170 
 Another interestingly weak point of the invasion was that the United States 
anticipated that anti-Castro Cubans would join the fight against the revolutionary 
militias, and that Cubans who previously supported Castro would be enlightened by the 
democratic beliefs of the opposition and turn against the revolution. However, the CIA 
misjudged how committed the majority of Cubans were to the revolution. Thus, the 
revolutionaries would likely fight harder to defend their territory against invaders. 
Second, the Cubans who were opposed to the Castro regime were not likely to come 
forward and join the fight because of their faith in the United States military. Many 
Cubans who supported the U.S. believed that the U.S in all of its military glory could and 
would overthrow the regime with little effort. Therefore, they could not justify fighting in 
the battle themselves. 171 
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 After the dust had settled at Playa Girón, Fidel Castro once again approached 
the podium to address the Cuban people and debrief the recent battle. Castro explained 
how the United States’ plan to destabilize Cuba had come in three stages. The U.S.  
had first used tactics of economic aggression, followed by acts of “terrorism” in the form 
of bombs over the cane fields, and had come to a head with direct aggression in the 
form of an invasion of Cuba. Castro spoke about Kennedy in a disappointed yet strong 
manner. He stated: 
 
We awaited his inauguration to see if he would do something different. We did 
not believe that he would continue with the errors of the previous administration. 
He himself said: “Let us begin anew.” He did not begin anew; he began as of old. 
He not only followed the policy of Eisenhower, but he was even more aggressive 
against us. This gentleman has brought this problem on himself, through his lack 
of common sense. He has earned this discredit all by himself. While we waited 
for him to show what policy he was going to follow, he increased the attacks 
against us. He increased in intensity the aggression against our country. 172 
 
 
 After Cuba declared itself communist, and the Bay of Pigs invasion failed, 
President Kennedy took full responsibility for the failure. The newly appointed Secretary 
of State, Dean Rusk, was disheartened by the failure and stated that the events at 
Playa Girón were “one hell of a way to close out my first hundred days as Secretary of 
State.”173 Shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy organized a group of men to 
debrief the operation and investigate what could have been done to make the invasion 
more effective. The men assigned to the commission were Maxwell Taylor, Robert 
Kennedy, Allen Dulles, and Arleigh Burke. The commission investigated the short 
comings of the invasion and drew the conclusion that a special strategic committee was 
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needed in order to stage future invasions like the Bay of Pigs. The commission also 
reported to the president that they believed the United States was losing the Cold War 
on all fronts and the only way to combat that is to unite all of the forces within the 
executive branch and work together against U.S. enemies. 174 
 The United States was indeed losing ground in the Cold War, or at least failing 
to contain the spread of Communism. On May 2, 1961, Fidel Castro declared Cuba a 
communist nation and set an agenda to being drafting a new socialist constitution for 
Cuba. In addition to the socialist constitution, Castro argued that the people of Cuba did 
not have time for elections because they were too busy fighting off North American 
imperialists. He added that Cuba had no used for political parties other than the 
revolutionary party because the presence of multiple political parties in Cuba was “Just 
an expression of class interests.” He further argued “Here there is just one class, the 
humble; that class is in power and so it is not interested in the ambition of an exploiting 
minority to get back in power. Those people would have no chance at all in an election.” 
He closed the discussion on open elections by stating “The revolution has no time to 
waste in such foolishness.” 175 
 The U.S. government responded to the recent events in Cuba with a new plan 
of how to proceed. The department of State provided two options for dealing with Cuba. 
The first was the immediate elimination of Fidel Castro. The second was a long-term 
isolation and containment plan which would ideally lead to an uprising by the Cuban 
people. The State Department favored option two. The first step in their action plan was 
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to initiate an “Alliance for Progress” which was an organization meant to foster 
cooperation between the United States and Latin American countries. By developing 
this organization, it would strengthen the relationship with the U.S. and Latin America 
while pushing Cuba into the dark and isolating it from the rest of Latin America.  
 The second step was to construct a new façade for the United States. The 
State Department wanted Cuba and the world to believe that the U.S had abandoned 
the idea of an intervention and did not mean any harm. They further wanted their 
audience to believe that the United States number one objective in the Cuban dilemma 
was to see the Cuban people freed from oppression by Castro and from Soviet 
domination. To reach their goals, it became more apparent to the State Department that 
the United States should apply the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to Cuba, which would 
gradually reduce the few exports the United States sold to Cuba in 1961 such as food 
stuffs and medical supplies.  
 Lastly, the State Department suggested that the United States train freedom 
fighters to initiate a counter-revolutionary movement within Cuba itself. In order to 
accomplish this however, government agencies needed to get more intel. If the United 
States were to again invade Cuba, the State Department declared that it would be on 
overt operation and the United States would no longer hide behind the mask of a Cuban 
opposition force. 176 
 Months after the State Department devised their updated plan, the CIA began 
working on a new operation: Operation Mongoose. Chester Bowels of the State 
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Department suggested that Operation Mongoose was a “higher-level failure” than the 
Bay of Pigs invasion, meaning it would have greater repercussions in the event of 
failure on the part of the United States. 177 The basics of Operation Mongoose were 
quite similar to the plan designed by the State Department. The goal was to initiate a 
rebellion against Castro resulting in a revolt of the Cuban people against the Castro 
regime.  
 The first step in the Operation Mongoose was to establish a democratic political 
movement in Cuba. The political movement would then be coupled with economic 
sabotage, and psychological warfare to turn Castro’s people against him. One of the 
major economic blows in Operation Mongoose was when Kennedy instated a full 
economic embargo against Cuba in February of 1962. 178 The embargo has remained 
the symbol of U.S. hostility toward Cuba.  
 Robert F. Kennedy was appointed by John F. Kennedy to spearhead the CIA’s 
Operation Mongoose. After the economic embargo, Operation Mongoose quickly turned 
from destabilizing the Cuban economy, political atmosphere, and regime to another 
assassination attempt of Fidel Castro. There were several assassination attempts that 
stemmed from Operation Mongoose. Some of which were exploding conch shells, 
poisoned pens, sniper rifles, and the ever-creative fungus-infected scuba gear to be 
given as gift to Castro.179 It is unconfirmed whether John F. Kennedy and Robert F. 
Kennedy knew about or approved of the assassination plans, or whether the CIA acted 
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alone. However, it is likely that the late President and his brother were somehow 
involved.  
 The CIA therefore continued their pattern of hostility toward Cuba throughout 
much of the Kennedy administration, while the State Department allowed events to 
unfold and veered away from using force. However, though the CIA and the State 
Department had different approaches in dealing with Fidel Castro and his nation, none 
of the strategies were effective. Cuba combatted the economic blows with Soviet trade 
agreements and combatted the physical invasion using strategies similar to those the 
revolutionaries had used to come to power in the first place.  
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Chapter 5 
At the Brink and Beyond 
 
 The year 1962 was the point of no return for the United States and Cuba. All 
the past issues came to a head during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy was first 
informed about the missiles on October 14, 1962 after a U-2 spy plane completed a six-
minute fly over of the island and captured photographs of a nuclear missile site. The 
CIA and the president kept the information secret until the issue was better investigated 
as not to panic the American people.180 
  It was alarming for the president and government officials who were in the 
know, because nuclear weapons were the most destructive and powerful weapons in 
the world. After the second world war, officials tried desperately keep the United States 
the exclusive global owner of nuclear technology. The Soviet Union quickly developed 
nuclear weapons of their own and were then a major threat to the United States.  
However, the Soviet Union did not possess missiles that were in range of targeting the 
United States with an attack until they placed missiles in Cuba in the fall of 1962. The 
United States saw this as an act of aggression both on the part of the Soviet Union and 
on the part of Cuba. The result of a nuclear attack from missiles launched in Cuba 
would be devastating to the United States. If attacked, the United States would have 
presumably retaliated with equal force. The result of such an exchange may have 
                                                        
180 Office of the Historian, Transcript of a Meeting at the White House, Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1961-1962, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 16. Kennedy 
Library, President’s Office Files, (Washington, D.C.), October 16, 1962.  
90 
 
resulted in mutually assured destruction for both the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  
 While Kennedy contemplated what to make of his newly acquired information, 
Khrushchev sent a telegram to the United States asking why Kennedy was so afraid of 
Cuba. He argued that the United States was such a prominent and powerful nation that 
it should never realistically fear a small island such ask Cuba.181  However, it was not 
necessarily Cuba that the United States feared, but rather, their alliance with the Soviet 
bloc.  
  Khrushchev further maintained that two great nations such as the Soviet Union 
and the United States should be reasonable and should not push around small 
countries and force them to adhere to the same values and same style of government 
as the larger power. He pointed out that the Soviet Union would never agree with 
capitalism just as America would never agree with communism. He further suggested 
for both countries to not interfere with the internal affairs of smaller countries and for the 
United States and the Soviet Union to live in relative peace.182 Khrushchev may have 
strategically staged this telegram because he knew that if U.S. officials had not already 
discovered the Soviet missiles in Cuba, they soon would. This conversation then could 
be used as leverage to argue that the Soviet Union did not aim to militarily harm the 
United States, but simply level the playing field, as the United States had a missile base 
in Turkey.  
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 By October 19, 1962, the CIA had produced a special national intelligence 
estimate on the missiles in Cuba. The CIA suggested that the Soviet Union installed the 
missiles in Cuba so they could use them as a bargaining chip. More specifically, the CIA 
anticipated that the Soviet Union would offer to trade Cuba for Berlin. Berlin was much 
more valuable to the Soviet Union both because it was geographically closer to the 
Soviet Union, and because the Soviet Union already controlled the eastern half of 
Berlin. Therefore, in the event of a trade, Berlin would be consolidated under Soviet 
rule. Cuba, on the other hand was closer to the United States, and the U.S. had been 
invested in the territory for decades. To the Soviets, trading Berlin for Cuba seemed like 
a win-win. The United States, however, did not see it that way and the CIA reported that 
the United States government would decline any offer to trade the two territories.  
  The CIA’s national intelligence report stated that if the United States allowed 
the missile build-up to continue in Cuba, it would give momentum to the global 
communist movement. It would open the door for other communist countries to 
welcome the construction of missile bases in their counties.  Furthermore, the CIA 
argued if the United States tolerated the presence of missiles in Cuba, it would cause 
the world to question why and make the United States appear weak and defeated by 
the communists. Therefore, the CIA thought it necessary to stage an attack on Cuba in 
order to forcibly remove the missiles from the island. The CIA thought it would be more 
effective to launch a surprise attack rather than to send a warning to Khrushchev or 
Castro. The CIA anticipated that the United States would have a better chance of 
victory, if the enemy were not expecting the attack. 183 
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 While the CIA discussed an attack on Cuba, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
presented a different strategy. Rusk suggested that the United States establish a 
quarantine zone in the international waters surrounding Cuba. This quarantine zone 
would serve as a blockade, guarding the Cuban ports from receiving any materials from 
the Soviet Union meant to contribute to the construction of the missiles on the island. 
The blockade would ensure that the missile construction was halted while the United 
States and the Soviet Union sorted out the situation.  The State Department, like other 
government agencies, was desperate to remove missiles from the island, however, the 
State Department opposed an invasion or an attack as a means to reach that end. 184 
After the CIA’s last invasion failed miserably, Kennedy thought it wise to go with the 
State Department’s recommendation and stage a blockade of naval ships around the 
island. This way, Kennedy could be sure that the work on the missile was halted. 185  
 Negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev continued for thirteen days. 
Many Americans considered those to be some of the most stressful days the world had 
ever seen. Americans were preparing for nuclear war like never before. They were 
stocking their bomb shelters with canned goods and drinking water. People across the 
nation understood that one wrong move on the part of either party could have been 
catastrophic for the world. On October 28, 1962 Khrushchev sent a message to 
president Kennedy proposing that if the United States agreed to not invade Cuba, then 
the Soviet Union would remove their missiles from the island. The Soviet Union also 
requested that the United States remove their missiles from Turkey. President Kennedy 
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initially agreed to only the first term, thus ruling out any future Cuban invasions. 
Kennedy however took an additionally two days to think over the request to remove 
American missiles from Turkey. In the final days of October 1963, the two countries 
signed nuclear treaties and agreed to establish a hot line between Washington and 
Moscow in hopes that future conflicts could be handled with more ease. 186   
 The CIA, however, could not let the idea of a physical invasion go. John 
McCone, CIA director and other officials tried desperately to keep President Kennedy 
from signing the agreement with the Soviet Union which banned the United States from 
invading Cuba.187 They could not let an opportunity for redemption of their failure at 
Playa Girón slip away. To the CIA’s dismay, the president did indeed sign the 
agreement, which halted all plans of a Cuba invasion from the CIA. Their attempt to 
hinder Kennedy from signing away their last hope of victory suggests that the CIA 
valued the possibility of a future invasion of Cuba more than settling one of the most 
stressful situations of the twentieth century.  
 The end of the missile crisis also brought about the end of Operation 
Mongoose. With the hope of a military invasion of Cuba off the table and the full 
economic embargo already established, there was hardly a purpose to pursue the 
operation further. Furthermore, Operation Mongoose was designed more for 
circumstances in which Fidel Castro was hostile to the United States. Operation 
Mongoose was even less useful after the State Department reported that Castro had 
made comments, after the missile crisis, alluding to a possible truce between the U.S. 
and Cuba. His change of heart may have stemmed from his understanding of how close 
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Cuba had come to being nothing more than a bargaining chip to the Soviet Union. As a 
result of his epiphany, Castro attempted to slowly decrease his dependence on Soviet 
supplies and the USSR as a whole. The State Department entertained his request, as 
they had a reputation for favoring discourse over militancy.188 The conflict between the 
United States and Cuba was long from over and Castro was never able to reconcile with 
the U.S. leaders. Agencies maintained their same strategies for dealing with Cuba as 
they had from the beginning.  
 The State Department’s willingness to hear Castro’s request and engage in a 
discussion of his proposal demonstrates how the State Department kept to the same 
strategy they proposed when Castro took office: to open the floor for discussion before 
pursuing physical violence. Likewise, after the Bay of Pigs invasion and the missile 
crisis, the CIA also did not veer from their original approach to the matter of Cuban 
affairs and favored a militant response to the recent events in Cuba. They were and had 
always been prepared to march into Cuba, armed and dangerous. These two agencies 
had many decades to continue conjuring new ideas for foreign policy in regard to Cuba, 
because Cuba prevailed, and was a thorn in the side of the United States for years to 
come. The tension between the countries was so great that even when the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991, the United States still maintained the embargo against Cuba.  
 Historians refer to the beginning of the 1990’s in Cuba as the “Special Period.” 
This was a prolonged period in which Cuba suffered a devastating socioeconomic 
collapse. The Cuban people were nearly starving and the government at times did not 
have enough revenue to keep the electricity on in the Capital, let alone more remote 
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areas of the island. During the Special Period, government officials made the executive 
decision to conserve what little energy they had during the economic collapse and turn 
on the public electric meters only during the day, so businesses could stay up and 
running.  
 In the special period, the people living on the rural farms were mostly 
untouched by the poverty that had devastated urban areas. This is widely due to the 
fact that people living in rural areas whose livelihood came from agriculture were able to 
grow their own food and butcher their own animals. They did not rely on imports from 
superpowers like the United States or the Soviet Union. The people living in the urban 
areas were the ones who struggled most. Citizens who had worked in offices or in 
factories their whole lives could not feed themselves because they lacked the skills and 
space to plant crops. Cuba developed an interesting system to combat the issue of 
starvation. They created urban farms. City dwelling Cubans transformed vacant lots in 
Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and other cities into large scale community gardens.189  
 Because the economy was suffering many people simply did not have the 
funds to purchase items on the urban farms and thus the farms began allowing 
bartering and trading. Whole neighborhoods banded together to fulfill each other’s 
needs. The urban farms were one way Cuba was able to survive after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union when American Presidents refused to reestablish trade with Cuba.  
  One could argue that the Special Period in Cuba was a golden opportunity for 
the United States to reestablish dominance in the region. With Cuba struggling, they 
may have been more likely to cooperate with U.S policies. The opportunity in Cuba for 
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foreign business investments was at an all-time high, yet U.S. presidents during this 
period did not attempt to Capitalize on Cuba’s misfortune. This could be widely due to 
the fact that in order to establish agreements with another country, it was necessary to 
have a diplomatic relationship with that country. Some argue that the United States 
declined to recommence their diplomatic relationship with Cuba, because it would have 
symbolized victory for the revolution. Further it would have represented a flawed and 
weak United States. It would have been an example of how communism could trump 
democracy. 190 Therefore, the United States government may have avoided 
reestablishing a relationship with Cuba in order to protect its reputation and prominent 
world status.   
 The decades passed and yet the United States never was able to overthrow or 
assassinate Fidel Castro. In fact, at the summit of Latin American Presidents gathering 
in 2006 Castro stated “I’m really happy to reach 80. I never expected it, not least having 
a neighbor, the greatest power in the world, trying to kill me everyday.” 191 Lars Schoultz 
was right in the sense that Castro would certainly die in Cuba before he would be 
overthrown. Castro passed the presidency on to his younger brother Raul Castro in 
2006 due to old age and illness.  
 Fidel Castro died on November 25, 2016. He was 90 years old. The world 
opinion of Castro’s death was quite mixed. The Cubans in Cuba mourned, while the 
Cubans in Miami celebrated. U.S. officials waited patiently to see what would come after 
Castro’s death and if a turbulent page of history had finally turned. Though Fidel 
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Castro’s death was not synonymous with the death of the Castro regime, it was 
certainly symbolic. It was a symbol of success for the Cuban people, a symbol of 
perseverance for other suppressed nations, and it was a symbol of failure to the United 
States government.  
 For many, Fidel Castro was the revolution. Therefore, his peaceful death was a 
symbol of victory for Cuba because he was never brought to his knees by an imperialist 
power. He never was assassinated despite all the U.S. officials’ attempts to do so, and 
he was never overthrown from by an internal rebellion. Because many Cubans view 
Castro as the physical representation of the revolution, these facts applied to Cuba as 
well. Revolutionary Cuba was never dominated by an imperialist power. After the Bay of 
Pigs invasion, it was never again attacked violently by the United States and the 
revolution was never seriously challenged by anti-Castro rebellion. Castro’s death was 
mourned by many Cubans. Yet the symbolism of his peaceful death could also have 
given his supporters hope and confidence for the future of the regime. 
 Other nations were also watching the Cuban revolution unfold. In fact, one of 
the biggest worries of U.S. officials after 1959 was that Castro would export his 
revolution and try to help other Latin American countries to establish revolutionary 
movements. Therefore, the fact that Castro was never assassinated by and was able to 
keep his revolution going for decades was inspiring for onlookers. Castro’s death served 
a symbol of perseverance to other suppressed nations.  
 The United States government, on the other hand, was dismayed by the fact 
that Castro was never taken out. He slipped through their fingers and despite their best 
efforts, there was nothing that could be done about it Thus, Castro’s peaceful death in 
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Havana represented total failure for the United States. The whole Cuban Revolution 
was a disappointment for the United States. It was the first time the United States had 
ever been embarrassed by a country so small in physical size and in the arena of global 
power. The United States had triumphed in the World Wars and was idolized by the rest 
of the world as an undefeatable heroic force. However, the undefeatable heroic force 
that was the United States was outmaneuvered by a country it used to dominate. Cuba 
was only the first of several similar embarrassments of the twentieth century. It is 
evident that U.S. government officials did not learn from their undesirable encounters 
with Cuba.   
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Conclusion 
 Cuba had an unfortunate hand dealt to it from the start. It had many positive 
attributes like the fertile land, the ideal climate, and its perfectly situated geographic 
locations. However, all of the positive attributes were also the cause of most of Cuba’s 
problems. Larger, more powerful nations preyed upon Cuba so that they too could have 
access to such resources. Nations like Spain, United States, and the Soviet Union used 
Cuba to propel their own interests and the latter two abandoned Cuba when there was 
nothing left to gain from the small island.  
 After Castro nationalized U.S. businesses, the executive leaders placed an 
embargo on Cuba. Cuba then became invisible to the United States in the realm of 
global trade from that moment on. Cuba was similarly abandoned by the Soviet Union 
during its collapse. The Soviet Union had nothing more to offer to Cuba, and thus 
stopped sending supplies and ended trade as the Soviet bloc came crashing down. 
Cuba, therefore, has historically never gotten along with superpowers.  
 However, in the grand scheme of things, Cuba has prevailed. Things might 
have turned out differently had Castro not overthrown Batista, but the facts remain. 
Castro did overthrow Batista and it was a revolution unlike any other. Castro united the 
Cuban people under nationalist and anti-imperialist ideals. He and the masses believed 
in a Cuba for the Cubans. He was able to raise the standard of living in Cuba for the 
peasant class and achieve astonishing increases in literacy rates by the middle of his 
rule.  
 However, the fact remains that Cuba remains a relatively underdeveloped 
nation. In a recent trip to Cuba I witnessed much of the rural population living in humble 
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conditions with few or no luxuries. The infrastructure has been weathered by the course 
of time. Many buildings, roads, and bridges are dilapidated. Though Cuba did prevail 
under the Castro regime, and some Cubans remained fond of Castro, there is certainly 
room for improvement. Many Cubans living in the United States vowed to never go back 
to Cuba until the Castro’s were out of office.  
 For the first few years of Castro’s rule, he maintained that he was not a 
communist and even preached democratic ideals to his people. During the time in which 
he had not yet declared himself a communist, he argued that the United States labeled 
Cuba as communist because they needed a reason to invade. There were likely a 
number of reasons why U.S. officials categorized Castro and Cuba as communist. One 
reason was probably that Castro’s agrarian reform was based on the communist 
principle of the redistribution of wealth. Another likely reason that the United States 
government labeled Castro a communist was that there were many communist groups 
operating within Cuba, and Castro allowed those groups to exist and assemble. 
However, simply because there are convincing reasons to believe Castro was a 
communist, does not mean that Castro was not on to an interesting theory about why 
Cuba was labeled communist.  
 Castro’s argument that the United States used communism as a scapegoat to 
invade Cuba is an interesting stance. It was certainly convenient for U.S. officials to 
speculate that Fidel Castro was a communist after he had just expropriated millions of 
dollars of land, resources, and businesses from the United States. Thus, it is possible 
that U.S. officials sought a more compelling reason for invading a country than solely 
the loss of profits. They needed to be able to justify an invasion of Cuba to the rest of 
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the world and to the American people. They did not want their reputation tarnished by 
overthrowing country that had long been an ally without just cause. Therefore, Fidel 
suggested that the United States labeled Cuba as communist to do just that--to invent a 
valid reason for an invasion.  
 Though it is just speculation, perhaps there is more to the story, a part that may 
only become disclosed after the U.S. government declassifies more government 
documents under the freedom of information act. Such declassified documents have 
revealed numerous vital pieces of information, like the CIA and State Department 
approaches and strategies for dealing with Cuba. 
 The CIA opted for a strategy that would bring Cuba to its knees and submit to 
the United States’ will whereas the State Department opted for a more peaceful route. 
The CIA treated Cuba like a communist enemy, while the State Department extended 
Cuba more democratic courtesy. Lars Schoultz’s definition of the democratic process 
bears an uncanny resemblance to how the State Department treated Cuba.  
 Democracy is . . . best conceived as a never-ending process of nonviolent 
contestation and accommodation, a process that requires the slow, ceaseless 
perfection of rules and procedures in a crowded environment where everyone 
has a right to help determine who gets what, when, and how. . . Democracies 
require people who know how to bargain. 192 
 
The State Department tried numerous times to bargain with Cuba, all the while 
suggesting that the United States remain within the confines of international law and 
remain true to their treaty obligations. The State Department further tried to launch less 
violent initiatives because they thought the outcome would be better if they slowly 
deteriorated the Cuban economy, rather than staging a violent invasion.  
                                                        
192 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 565.  
102 
 
 These two agencies strategies also withstood the test of time. The CIA director 
position as well as the Secretary of State position saw rotation in the years from the 
Cuban Revolution to the Missile Crisis. However, it would seem that the strategies each 
agency provided for Cuba were rooted too deeply to be overturned by a new 
administrator. For example, Allen Dulles, CIA director from 1953 to 1961, staged and 
implemented the Bay of Pigs invasion. His predecessor, John McCone, took over in 
November of 1961 and continued to plan Operation Mongoose. Operation Mongoose 
was just as large of failure as was the Bay of Pigs. Therefore, it would seem that the 
transition of power between Dulles and McCone had little effect on the CIA’s strategy for 
dealing with Cuba. 
 The same was true for the State Department. There were three Secretaries of 
State between 1959 and 1963:  John Dulles, Christian Herter, and Dean Rusk. John 
Dulles’ position as Secretary of State ended in the same month that Castro visited the 
United States for the first time. Before Dulles left the State Department, he oversaw the 
drafting of a document outlining how to treat Castro in his trip to the United States. The 
document proposed encouraging democratic ideals and suggestive language to try and 
sway Castro back closer to center on the political spectrum. There was no talk in this 
memorandum about violence or conspiracy, rather just the simple art of persuasion. 
 Christian Herter, John Dulles’ successor, continued a similar strategy of 
persuasion. In October of 1960 the State Department released a new policy for foreign 
relations with Cuba, which stated that it should be made clear that the chances of a U.S. 
invasion of Cuba were slim to none. The State Department followed that up by 
suggesting that democratic ideals within Cuba should be encouraged and the 
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consolidation of the Castro regime should be discouraged. Therefore, under Herter’s 
leadership, the State Department maintained a persuasive rather than invasive 
strategy.193   
 The third Secretary of State who falls into the scope of this study was Dean 
Rusk. Rusk accepted the position as Secretary of State on Kennedy’s inauguration day. 
Rusk did not share Kennedy’s desire for invasion. By the time Kennedy took office, the 
planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion was already well advanced. After the invasion 
failed miserably and the CIA began planning Operation Mongoose, Rusk was against it. 
During the Missile Crisis, Rusk advocated for a naval blockade instead of an invasion. 
In comparison, the Cuban Missile Crisis had a more favorable outcome than the Bay of 
Pigs invasion. It is quite possible that the State Department’s less violent foreign policy 
for Cuba could have yielded even more positive results, had it been used in place of 
invasion plans.  
 The situation in Cuba could have had many different outcomes but the 
outcome that took place was one that no one in the United States government imagined 
would be the case in the early days of the Cuban Revolution. U.S. government officials 
imagined that Castro and his rebels would lose momentum or fail to overthrow Batista. 
When they did succeed in overthrowing the Batista regime, U.S. officials assumed 
Castro could be easily defeated. They were wrong. Castro preached that Cuba would 
“fight to the last man,” and his vision of the future largely prevailed.194 Against all odds, 
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pinched in the middle of a contentious ideological battle between two superpowers, the 
tiny island of Cuba was able to hold its own and maintain its independence to a large 
degree. 
 What became of the United States? U.S. presidents stayed bitter toward Cuba 
for the rest of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. The embargo 
stayed in place, American tourists were prohibited from traveling to Cuba, and 
education in America presented a warped view of the events in Cuba to its youth. As a 
middle and high school student growing up in in Wisconsin, I learned about the conflict 
of Cuba through a lens tainted by bitterness. Educators at that level informed students 
like me that Cuba brought their problems on themselves and dished out unwarranted 
hostility to the United States. I did not learn that the struggle between the United States 
and Cuba was a long contentious battle in which both sides threw punches until I was in 
upper-level undergraduate courses. It was rarely mentioned that the United States 
government had made decisions such as cutting the sugar quota that positively 
contributed to Cuba’s growing relationship with the Soviet Union. The United States 
enacted policies like this against Cuba that left Cuba with only two choices: to either let 
their country crumble, with devastating consequences for the population, or to align with 
the Soviet Union in order to strengthen their broken economy. Cuba chose the latter, 
and the U.S. government officials and policy makers were appalled by their decision.   
 In the twenty-first century, Cuba and the United States entered what foreign 
policy officials call a period of “normalization.” However, things are still far from normal. 
The Obama administration removed some of the restrictions on Cuba and President 
Obama even went to Cuba for a visit in 2016, making him the first U.S. president to visit 
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Cuba in nearly nine decades. This visit, however, was only a preliminary step in what 
will likely be a long road to restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba. Obama also lifted 
some restrictions on American tourism in Cuba and took steps to adjust the embargo. 
Still, this step represents at best a beginning. Perhaps there is a brighter chapter for 
U.S. Cuban relations yet to come.  
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